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I. INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine is controversial.' This article evaluates whether
the public trust doctrine should be applied to water management. To illustrate
the issue, consider the following legislation proposed in Michigan:
The waters of the state, including groundwater, are held in trust by the state.
The state shall protect these waters and other natural resources that are sub-

ject to the public trust for the benefit of present and future generations.'
Some states have enacted legislation applying the public trust doctrine to
water management.' Other states, however, have rejected such application. For
1. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the TraditonalDoctrine, 19 ENvrrL. L. 425, 426 (1989) [hereinafter The
Headwatersofthe Public Trusil (noting that the public trust doctrine is "perhaps the single most
controversial development in natural resources law"). Compare Michael C. Blumm, Public
Propertyand the Democratizationof Western Water Law: A Modern View ofthe Public Trust
Doctrine, 19 ENvTL. L. 573, 595-97 (1999) (hereinafter Public Propertyand the Democratzzation of Western Water Lau] (arguing that the public trust doctrine serves as a democratizing
influence by incorporating the interests and liberty of the public at large in legal rules governing
the use of natural resources), Kith James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust
Doctrinein a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 19 ENVrL. L. 527, 549 (1989) [hereinafter A Fish Out
of Watel (arguing that modem public trust doctrine threatens constitutional democracy and
individual liberty by allowing courts to supersede the determinations of representative institutions and by disingenuously immunizing state actions from Fifth Amendment challenges on the
basis of a legal fiction of public property). Illustrative of the attention applied to the doctrine,
Professor Huffman calculated that more than 1,700 articles referencing the public trust doctrine
were published between 1990 and 2007. James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths:
A History of the Pubhc Trust Doctrine, 18 DuKE ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 1, 13 n. 59 (2007)
[hereinafter Speaking ofInconvenient Truths].
2. H.R. 5319, 95th Leg. (Mich. 2009). The proposed legislation, which was not adopted,
provoked significant controversy. See Sheri McWhirter, Scripps' Water Rihts Bill Draws Citicism: Michigan House Bill No. 5319, THE RECORD-EAGLE (Mar. 24, 2010) available at
http://record-eagle.com/grandtraverse/x794091158/Scripps-water-rights-bill-draws-criticism
(reporting an explanation by the bill's legislative author that the bill was intended to "end the
idea of groundwater as a commodity" and to curtail groundwater uses that are not sustainable;
reporting argument by opponents that the bill would transfer "all private property water rights to
the state without proper compensation").
3. See, e.g., N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. S 481:1 (2013) (declaring the state to be trustee of the
waters of the state for the public benefit); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, S 1390 (2008) ("it is the policy
of the state that the groundwater resources of the state are held in trust for the public"). Michigan law also declares that "waters of the state are valuable public natural resources held in trust
by the state." MICH. COMP. LAws § 324.32702(c) (2008). The Michigan courts have explained
that such declaration "merely recognize Isi the importance of natural resources, including water,
and exhortis] the Legislature to exercise its police power to conserve them... land does] not
attempt to claim ownership of water by the state itself." Mich. Citizens for Water Conserv. v.
Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174, 221 (Mich. CL App. 2005).
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instance, an Idaho statute provides ". . . the public trust doctrine shall not ap-

ply to. .. [the appropriation or use of water, or the granting, transfer, administration, or adjudication of water or water rights... or any other procedure or
law applicable to water rights in the state of Idaho."' Voters in Ohio overwhelmingly approved a ballot initiative to amend the state constitution to provide that "[giround water underlying privately owned land and nonnavigable
waters located on or flowing through privately owned land shall not be held in
trust by any governmental body."'
Given such policy divergence among the states and the extensive controversy surrounding the doctrine, it is proper to ask whether the adoption of
legislation declaring state waters subject to the public trust is necessary or prudent. This article argues that policymakers should resist calls to adopt the public trust doctrine as the basis for water resource management; instead, they
should develop a coherent and, comprehensive body of water management
laws designed to maximize public welfare. We conclude that reliance on the
public trust doctrine as a basis of water management would be imprudent, not
only because its utility has faded with the law's evolution, but because it threatens to impede the development of a coherent and unified body of water management laws.'
Originating in Byzantine law and promulgated over the course of centuries,' the public trust doctrine is based on a legal fiction that certain common
and shared natural resources, such as air, water, and wildlife, are "public property" held in trust by the state for the public's benefit.' The legal fiction of public ownership, or state trusteeship, over natural waters does not infer proprietary ownership by the state or the public, but rather provides a legal shorthand
to express the societal importance of water and the state's sovereign power to
regulate and manage it for the public's benefit.'For centuries, this legal fiction
served a vital practical purpose. Before the development of the modem regula-

4.
5.

IDAHO CODE ANN. S 58-1203(2)(b) (2013).
OHIO CONST. art. I, S19b(E). The vote, held in 2008, was 71.95 percent in favor of the
initiative. OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, NOVEMBER 4, 2008 GENERAL ELECTION, REPORT FROM
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND THE CITIZENS OF

OHIO app. at 249 (2008) avadable at http://mwy.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/elections/2008/
gen/Report/AnendedOfficialResults/Statelssues.pdf.
6. See discussion iafra Parts IV and V.

7. Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust The TheoreticalImphcaons of the Public Trust
Docrinefor NaturalResource Managemen4 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 481 (2001).
8. 111.Cent R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
9. Sporhase v. Neb. ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 950-51 (1982) (explaining that the
notion of public ownership of water is "a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance
to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important
resource"). The public trust doctrine is not objectionable because of its fictional foundation. See

Hope M. Babcock, The Puhic Trust Doctrne: What a Tall Tale

They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REv.

393, 394, 400 (2009) (noting that courts routinely resort to legal fictions to achieve efficient and
equitable results, and arguing that the public trust doctrine is a good legal fiction because it
performs a gap-Filling function in the absence of positive law). However, for the reasons we
explain herein we conclude that the public trust doctrine is a poor substitute for specific water
management laws, and that it threatens to confuse and frustrate the development of water management law. See discussion infra Parts IV and V.
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tory state, the law largely adhered to a classical liberal theory of property,
which generally favored individual autonomy over broad public interests."
Protectable interests were principally limited to the defense of property." In
that legal environment, the fiction of "public property" served as a necessary
analogue to private property, providing a property basis to control private activities that threatened essential public interests, such as access to navigable
waters-the public trust doctrine's classic application."
A legal fiction of public property m water is no longer necessary to protect
public interests.. Modem legal jurisprudence and the growth of the administrative state have evolved to recognize and protect public interests in natural
resources independent of the legal fiction of public property." Indeed, the
legal contours of what constitutes private property have generally changed to
accommodate the protection of public interests." This is particularly true in
the context of water management where public and private interests are deeply
intertwined due to water's immense and diverse societal importance and its
nature as a transient and shared resource.'" Private property interests pertaining
to the acquisition, distribution, sale, transfer, and use of water are routinely
defined to yield to statutory or judicial protections of the public interest." As
the notable law professor, Frank Trelease, rhetorically asked, "Why is it better

10. See Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to ClassicalLiberal Property Theory, 20
VT. L. REv. 299, 299, 306 (1995) (reviewing and critiquing the classical liberal theory of property); see also Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception ofProperty: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1668 (1988); Robert C. Ellickson, Property
rn Land, 102 YALE. L.J. 1315, 1352-54 (1993); Ryan, supra note 7, at 484.
11. See Frazier,supranote 10, at 306-07.
12. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Propertyand Sovereignty rn Natural
Resources: Questionig the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 633 (1986) ("Most
simply put, the historical function of the public trust doctrine has been to provide a public
property basis for resisting the exercise of private property rights in natural resources deemed
contrary to the public interest."). See generally Harrison C. Dunning, The Pubhc Trust: A
FundanentalDoctrine ofAmerican PropertyLaw, 19 ENvTL. L. 515, 519-23 (1989); Alexandra B. Klass, Modem Pubc TrustPrinciples:Recognizing Rights and IntegratingStandards,82
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 702-06 (2006); Carol Rose, The Comnedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 721-23 (1986) [hereinafter Comedy of the Comnmonsl (analyzing the notion and implications of "property" bestowed in a disorganized public).
13. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 665 (explaining that the public trust doctrine arose at a
time, long since gone, when sovereign power depended on ownership, and that modern judicial
construction of sovereign police power does not turn on such strained legal fictions).
14. Throughout the law, modern jurisprudence is refining the definition of private property
to include appropriate conditions for the protection of public interests. See Lazarus, supra note
12, at 669-773; Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositionson Pivate Property,PublicRights and
the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265, 274-287 [hereinafter A Dozen
Propositions].
15. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 668 ("The relationship of the sovereign police power to private property has been marked by the steady erosion of private property's sanctity in the face of
the sovereign police power's growth.").
16. See Brian E. Gray, The Property Rightin Water, 9 HASTINGS W. Nw.J. ENVTL L. &
POL'Y 1, 4 (2002).
17. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 655.
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to say '[tihe state owns the water, therefore it may regulate its use' instead of
'Ithe state may regulate the use of water?'""
Even though the public trust doctrine is no longer needed to protect the
public interest in water resources, skeptical readers may naturally ask what
harm would come from embracing the doctrine with respect to water management. As we will explain, such an approach threatens to impair the development of a coherent body of water management law. Notably, application of
the doctrine to the use of water substitutes a superficial and ambiguous legal
doctrine where specific substantive and procedural provisions are necessary."
Further, on the basis of public "ownership" of a resource, some advocates
assert that the doctrine demands specific substantive results and removes administrative and judicial discretion over water resource decisions," presumably
even to the detriment of overall public welfare. Such extreme agendas should
be avoided in favor of balanced and nuanced water management. Finally, as a
judicially-fashioned doctrine, judicial precedence and restraint inherently limit
the public trust doctrine" and, thus, it is ill-suited to address many modem
water allocation problems. Unlike the judiciary, the legislative and executive
branches have broad latitude to adopt specifically tailored laws and statutes to
establish a consistent and sophisticated legal framework to manage the resource."
We evaluate the public trust doctrine with several fundamental policy objectives in mind. One measure of evaluating any water management policy is
how well the policy maximizes social welfare, or, in economic terms, its "utility."' In pursuit of maximum utility, policymakers must thoroughly consider
and balance competing and often countervailing social, environmental, and
economic objectives." For example, policymakers must weigh consumptive
water uses against ecological and other instream demands. Likewise, policymakers must balance the need for flexible water management against the desire for legal certainty to promote beneficial planning and investments.' Ap18. Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REv.
638, 645 (1957) [hereinafter Government Ownership.
19. See inha Parts V.A and V.B.
20. See e.g., James M. Olson, Navgatrng the Great Lakes Compact: Water, Publc Trus4
andInternationalTrade Agreements, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1103, 1130-32 (2006).
21. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 712-14. 22. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, S 5:44 (2010) [hereinafter LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES].
23. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 12-13 (8' ed. 2011) ("Utility"
refers to wealth, happiness, and welfare in both monetizable and non-monetizable metrics); see
also Lloyd R. Cohen, The Publc Trust Doctrine:An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L.
REv. 239, 255 (1992).
24. See A Dozen Propositions,supra note 14, at 298 (emphasizing the importance of balancing public and private "rights" to "maximize the value of the sum ofprivate and public resources."); see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BOARD,
VALUING GROUNDWATER, 61-65 (1997) (discussing the difficulty and importance of calculating
values for groundwater and presenting valuation methods); DIANA GIBBONS, THE EcONOMIC
VALUE OF WATER 65-71 (1986) (discussing the empirical evidence of the economic rationale
for inclusion of instream values in water use decisions).
25.

See POSNER, supra note 23, at 66.
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propriate limitations must, of course, bind utilitarian goals.' Most notably,
utilitarian goals must respect the settled and reasonable expectations of individuals and the public concerning the operation of the law.'
These competing policy priorities require a mature and impartial analysis.
Implicated policy issues include: (i) how to properly define property interests
in water; (ii) when and how to apply regulatory oversight; and (iii) how to
properly distribute the burdens of regulation among competing water users.
The development of specific water management laws and institutions compels
a careful consideration of these fundamental policy inquiries. By contrast, legislative adoption of the public trust doctrine as a water management principle
evades this necessary analysis; it introduces undue ambiguity as regulators and
courts seek to discern the legislature's intent in legislating a legal fiction that the
judiciary fashioned to address legal deficiencies in a past legal era.'
This article explores these issues in five parts. Part II discusses the development of the public trust doctrine, including its selective application to water
management. Part III considers the policy underpinnings of modern water
management as a context for evaluating proposals advocating a broader application of the public trust doctrine to water resource management. Part IV discusses why the public trust doctrine is neither necessary to achieve balanced
water management, nor to modify existing allocations to adapt to changing
circumstances. Notably, Part IV also explains that the public trust doctrine is
not needed to protect reasonable water management laws from Fifth Amendment takings claims, nor will the doctrine provide a defense from takings liability where such liability is otherwise justified. Part V examines why application
of the doctrine to water management may impede efforts to establish a coherent and balanced body of water management laws. Finally, Part VI concludes
with a brief discussion of how states may approach water management strategies to balance public and private interests in a legally-defensible manner.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The scope of the public trust doctrine's application is vague." Advocates
champion the doctrine's amorphous character,' which has been described as
26. See POSNER, supranote 23, at 16-20,, 42, 63-66 (examining moral and practical limitations of efficiency, utility, and utilitarian theories and arguing that the economic concepts of
efficiency and utility are vulnerable on the grounds of, inter aba, moral injustices stemming from
wealth inequality, impacts to personal liberties and autonomy, and costs on voluntary transactions).
27. See Joseph L. Sax, Liberatmg the Publc Trust Doctrine From Its HistoricalShackles,
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 185, 186-189 (1980) [hereinafter Liberanagthe PubEc Trust Doctrinel.
28. See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 692 (discussing the evolution of natural resources law to
balance competing private and social goals and explaining that the public trust doctrine's reliance on notions of property law and trusts threatens to undermine the law's development in this
respect).
29. See Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trus4 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.
351, 359 (1998) [hereinafter Sax and the Idea ofthe Publc Trust ("cases and commentators on
the public trust have been uncomfortably vague about its reach.").
30. See Publc Property and the Denocratizationof Western Water Law, supra note 1, at
575 (noting that one of the reasons for the popularity of the public trust doctrine is that it some-
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"amphibious," indicative of its modem expansion in some instances to resources beyond navigable waters," or "androgynous" and "chameleon-like," to
characterize the vast diversity of remedies it may provide." At its core, the doctrine is a legal fiction the courts created to justify enhanced judicial scrutiny of
governmental transactions involving common and shared resources, and "to
avoid judicially perceived limitations or consequences of existing rules of
law."'
Historically, the public trust doctrine principally protected public access to
navigable surface waters for a limited set of public purposes (e.g., navigation,
commerce, and fishing). More recent decisions in some jurisdictions have
broadened the doctrine's application to an expanded set of public interests,
including environmental protection and resource conservation, which may
effectively prevent public access in some instances." Such expansion of the
doctrine's scope differs substantially among the states."

times seems to be all things to all people); Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Pubhc Trust Doctrie
and CoastalZone Management in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REv. 521, 526-27 (1992)
(discussing purported benefits of the doctrine's flexibility in application).
31. See Scott W. Reed, The Pubhc Trust Doctrine:Is It Amphibious?, 1 J. ENvTL. L. &
LITIG. 107, 116 (1986).
32. Pubhi Propertyand the Democratizationof Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 575,
579 (arguing that the "chief characteristic of the doctrine is not so much the resources to which
it attaches or the scope of uses it favors, but the diversity of remedies it-provides to resolve resource conflicts").
33. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 656.
34. See Cohen, supra note 23, at, 254; Patrick Deveney, Title,Jus Publicum, and the Public
Trust An HistoricalAnalysis, 1 SEA GRANT L. J. 13, 41, 52-53 (1976); see also Molly Selvin,
The Public Trust Doctrmie in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L.
REV. 1403, 1408 (1980); The Headwatersofthe Pubc Trus4 supra note 1, at 428-30; Speakin oflnconvenient Truths, supra note 1, at 19-20.
35. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
ClassificationsofStates, PropertyRights, and State Summanes, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 1,
17-24 (2007) [hereinafter A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Publc Trust Doctrnes (discussing the evolution of the public trust doctrine in the East from the "federal public trust doctrine" centered on the protection of navigation, commerce, and fishing in navigable waters to
state articulations that promote an expanded set of public uses and interests); Robin Kundis
Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Publc Trust Doctries: Pubihc Values,
Private Rrghts, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Publc Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53,
80-91 (2010) [hereinafter A Comparative Guide to the Western States'PublicTrust Doctrhel
(discussing the emergence of an ecological public trust doctrine in California and Hawaii, and to
a lesser extent in other western states); see also William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and
the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the
Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REv. 385, 387 n.2 (1997) [hereinafter Democracy, Distrus4 and the Public Trust] (discussing doctrine as a source of judicial authority to supervise and limit natural resource use).
36. See generallyA Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines, supra note
35, at 30-43, Kith A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Pubhlic Trust Doctrne, supra
note 35, at 76, 188-96.
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A. THE NOTION OF PUBLIC WATER
The common law originally classified natural waters as res nulliusproperty of none-or res communes-property of all." The res communes
principle originated from the Institutes ofJustinian, which declared: "[Bly natural law these things are common to all mankind: air, running water, the sea,
and as a consequence the shores of the sea."" Open access to natural waters
was, of course, essential to economic activity when navigable waters were the
primary means of transport of goods and people." The French civil code,
Spanish civil law, and the English common law each perpetuated the characterization of natural waters as a common and public resource." This notion
ultimately evolved to treat navigable water resources as pubhlcijurs, public
property held in trust by the state for the public's benefit."
B. THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is founded on this characterization of water as
pubhcijuns. As the doctrine developed through English and ultimately American common law, courts applied it to proscribe public divestment of the beds
and shorelines of tidal-and later navigable-waters in a manner inconsistent
with the public's right of access for traditional public uses such as navigation,
commerce, and fishing.' The doctrine effectively imposed a public easement
on all private rights held in navigable waters, whereby any activity impairing
traditional public uses of a navigable waterway was subject to abatement or
37. Sullivan v. Richardson, 14 So. 692, 709 (Fla. 1894); Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 513
P.2d 627, 631 (Idaho 1973); Walbridge v. Robinson, 125 P. 812, 814 (Idaho 1912); see also
Government Owmership, supra note 18, at 640.
38. Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Mont 1933).
39. See Cohen, supra note 23, at, 254; see also Comedy ofthe Commons, supra note 12, at
753-54, 772-74.
40. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 634-35.
41. E.g., Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 (1935).
42. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1988) (refusing to
adopt a position denying the state an ability to retain fishing, hunting, and bathing rights for the
public); Shively v. Bowbly, 152 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1894) (explaining similarities and differences
between English and American conceptions of the doctrine); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 463-64 (1892) (holding that grant of harbor and lakefront to a railroad company was invalid insofar as the state had abdicated its trust over lands beneath navigable waters and to allow
such conveyance is inconsistent with state's obligation to preserve such water for public use);
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876) (as traditionally applied in the United States, the
doctrine embodied federal and state components; the federal navigation servitude granted the
federal government paramount control over commerce in interstate navigable waters, while the
states maintained sovereign ownership of the beds of navigable waters within their respective
borders); see also Lazarus, supra note 12, at 636-37 (noting that the doctrine recognized three
types of interests in navigable waters and submerged lands: the jus pubhcum, the common right
of the public for unobstructed use of trust lands and waters for traditional trust purposes; the jus
pivatum, referring to private interests to use and possess trusts lands and waters that remain
subject to the public rights vested in the public under the jus publicunr,and the jus regium, the
sovereign's powers to regulate navigable waters and submerged lands on behalf of the public);
Speakmg oflnconvenient Truths, supra, note 1, at 93-94 (noting the extension of the trust from
tidelands to navigable waters was a product of American common law).
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removal.' Although states differ both as to what constitutes navigable waters
and what public uses the trust protects, the principal purpose of the traditional
doctrine has remained to preserve public access to navigable waters and their
shores.'
The seminal case defining the traditional public trust doctrine in the United States is Illinois Centra/Railroadv. Ihlois." In that case, the United States
Supreme Court held that there was no unconstitutional impairment of contract
when the Illinois legislature repealed a prior grant to the railroad of a substantial portion of the Chicago lakefront and harbor because the state's tide to the
harbor and its shores was subject to the public trust." The court concluded that
any grant of trust property to a private entity was necessarily revocable, explaining that "the State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as
to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, ... than it
can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the
preservation of the peace."" The core principle emanating from Illimois Central and other traditional public trust cases is that public rights to access navigable waters and their shores for trust purposes shall be preserved."
C.THE ECOLOGICAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Concurrent with the rise of the modem environmental movement in the
early 1970s, environmental advocates, notably Professor Joseph Sax, began
promoting a broader application of the public trust doctrine that would extend
its geographic reach beyond navigable waters and expand the scope of protected trust values to include ecological, aesthetic, and recreational values, as well
as other aspects of resource conservation." Sax argued that the doctrine could
be used as a legal basis for "effective judicial intervention" to protect natural
resources and attendant environmental values." His argument was effectively a

43. See SpeakingofInconvenient Truths, supra note 1, at 94, 97-98.
44. Ill. Cent, 146 U.S. at 452-53; compareCWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115,
1121 (Alaska 1988); City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct., 606 P.2d 362, 373-74 (Cal. 1980), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380-81 (Cal. 1971); Idaho
Forest Indus. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement Dist., 733 P.2d 733, 737 (Idaho 1987);
Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170-72 (Mont. 1984); Mont. Coal. for
Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Mont. 1984); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. 1, 71
(NJ. 1821); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 703
(1988); see also The Headwatersof the Publc Trust, supra note 1, at 462-63.
45. II. Cent, 146 U.S. 387.
46. Id at 452.
47. Id at 453.
48. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 637-40.
49. Joseph L. Sax, The Publc Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law. Effective Judicial
Intervention,68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 556-57 (1970) [hereinafter Effectivejudiciallntervention.
50. Id. at 474, 555-58 (asserting that the public trust doctrine could be "useful as a tool of
general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource
management problems"); see also Lazarus, supra note 12, at 642 (characterizing Sax's assertions
as an argument that the doctrine contains at least three potential characteristics essential for the
development of an effective legal basis for environmental protection: (1) a legal right vested in
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"natural law" theory, asserting that certain public interests are "so intrinsically
important to every citizen that their free availability tends to mark the society
as one of citizens rather than of serfs."" In select cases, the courts have applied
the trust doctrine expansively to further ecological interests." However, as we
shall explain, in these cases the courts have principally ordered comprehensive
procedural consideration of ecological interests by public decision makers,
rather than commanding specific substantiveresults."
The leading case for the "ecological" public trust doctrine is National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court." In that case, the California Supreme
Court held that the public trust doctrine imposed an affirmative duty on the
state water board to reconsider the effect of permitted water withdrawals by the
City of Los Angeles's Department of Water and Power ("DWP") from nonnavigable streams in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, withdrawls that significantly
reduced inflow into Mono Lake." The reduced inflow caused the lake level to
recede, thereby impairing the lake's environmental, scenic, and recreational
assets." Although the state issued licenses to DWP in 1940, authorizing DWP
to make withdrawals, DWP did not utilize these licenses until the late 1960s."
Although the court recognized that it could have resolved the conflict on other
legal grounds," the plaintiffs' claims rested on the public trust doctrine." The
case thus presented a conflict between the public trust doctrine and California's appropriative water rights system, a conflict that the court described as
"the two systems of legal thought .. . on a collision course.""
the public, (2) enforceable against the government, and (3) capable of interpretation consistent
with contemporary environmental concerns).
51. EffecdveJudicialIntervenion, supra note 49, at 484 (citing Martin v: Waddell's Iessee,

41 U.S. 367, 414 (1842)).
52. See, e.g., Nat' Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (applying the
public trust doctrine to require state water board to consider reductions of authorized withdrawals), cert denied sub nom. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Nat'l Audubon
Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985 (Haw. 2006) (holding that the public trust imposes on the state an affirmative duty to protect trust resources from
pollution); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000) (applying the public
trust doctrine to management of surface water and groundwater withdrawals and impoundments); Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. Idaho, 899 P.2d 949, 953-55 (Idaho 1995) (overturning
summary judgment on grounds that public trust doctrine conferred standing to an environmental group to challenge a timber sale on state forest lands based on possible impacts to ecology of
navigable stream); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976) (holding that the public trust doctrine requires evidence of planning by appropriate state agencies with respect to allocation of water rights); Lake Beulah Mgmt.
Dist v. Wis. DNR, 335 Wis. 2d 47 (2011) (requiring consideration of environmental harm to
waters of the state when reviewing a permit application for a high capacity groundwater well); see
also Lazarus, supra note 12, at 647-52.
53. See discussion in/a Part II.D.
54. NatAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 719:
55. Id. at 728-29.
56. Id. at 711.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 728, n. 28.
59. Id. at 712.
60. Id. ("[tihis case brings together for the first time two systems of legal thought: the appropriative water rights system... and the public trust-. . . Ever since we first recognized that the
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DWP argued that the appropriative water rights system subsumed the
public trust doctrine, and, by virtue of its state-granted licenses, it enjoyed a
vested right in perpetuity to take water without concern for the consequences
to the lake's ecology." The court rejected this defense, explaining that possession of existing water rights did not preclude a later reconsideration and reallocation to mitigate ecological impacts."
The National Audubon opinion expanded the public trust doctrine in
several key ways. First, it recognized that the public trust doctrine evolves with
the changing public perception of the values and uses of waterways." In this
respect, the court found that the scope of protection afforded by the trust includes ecological, scenic, and recreational purposes." Second, the opinion
extended the geographic reach of the doctrine to include withdrawals from
non-navigable tributaries that affect navigable waters." Third, the court emphasized that water rights remain subject to the public trust and the state's continuing supervisorial duty under the trust." Fourth, the court explained that the
state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account and protect
public trust uses whenever feasible, both when initially planning and allocating
water resources and continually thereafter through the supervision of existing
and ongoing withdrawals." Finally, the court emphasized that "[in exercising
its sovereign power to allocate water resources in the public interest, the state is
not confined by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of
current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.""
Several other California opinions followed National Audubon and affirmed the public trust doctrine's broader ecological application in cases affecting water management.' Courts in several other states have similarly applied,
or alluded to a willingness to apply, the doctrine to the withdrawal and use of

public trust protects environmental and recreational values the two systems of legal thought have
been on a collision course.") (citing Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (1971); Ralph Johnson,
Publc TrustProtection for Stream Flows andLake Levels, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 233 (1980)).
61. Nat'IAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 727.
62. Id. at 728-29.
63. Id.at 719.
64. Id. ("The principal values plaintiffs seek to protect, however, are recreational and ecological-the scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for
nesting and feeding by birds. Under Marks v. Whitneyit is clear that protection of these values
is among the purposes of the public trust.") (internal citations omitted).
65. Id. at 721. The court refrained from determining whether the public trust extends to
protection of fishing, emironmental values, and recreation interests in non-navigable streams.
Id, at 721 n. 19.
66. Id.at 727-28.
67. Id.at 728.
68. Id.at 728.
69. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588,
601 (Ct. App. 2008) (extending the public trust doctrine to wildlife); United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 201-02 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the public trust
doctrine empowers the state to modify both federal and state appropriative permits and riparian
rights to meet state salinity and other water quality standards in the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta).
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water. These states include Hawaii," North Dakota," South Dakota," Utah,"
and Wisconsin." Notably, the Hawaii Supreme Court has strongly embraced
the doctrine, holding that the public trust reinforces existing statutory duties to
protect natural water bodies and may impose additional instream flow requirements and resource conservation duties on the state."
The states have differed as to whether the doctrine applies to nonnavigable surface waters and groundwater. Hawaii, Vermont, and New Hampshire
specifically apply the doctrine to groundwater, fully removing the navigability
restriction inherent in the traditional doctrine." Although California has not

extended the doctrine to groundwater," National Audubon required the state
to consider the impacts to navigable water bodies stemming from withdrawals
of water from tributary nonnavigable streams." That reasoning could imply
that the public trust doctrine might extend to groundwater extractions that
adversely impact navigable waters. Other state courts have ruled that the public

trust doctrine does not apply to groundwater." Additionally, a ballot initiative

70. See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 453 (Haw. 2000) ("Under the
public trust, the state has both the authority and duty to preserve the rights of present and future
generations in the waters of the state.").
71. See United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 463 (N.D. 1976) ("[Tlhe Public Trust Doctrine requires, as a minimum, evidence of some
planning by appropriate state agencies and officers in the allocation of public water resources"
and "permits alienation and allocation of precious state resources only after an analysis of present supply and future need.").
72. See Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 835 (S.D. 2004) (citing United Plainsmen, 247
N.W.2d at 463, with approval for the proposition that the public trust doctrine requires a state
to undertake public planning before it grants permits for appropriation of water).
73. SeeJj.N.P. Co. v. Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982) ("The State
regulates the use of water, in effect, as trustee for the benefit of the people").
74. See Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Wis. DNR., 799 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Wis. 2011) (requiring consideration of potential environmental harm in reviewing an application for a high capacity groundwater well).
75. See, e.g., Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1003 (Haw. 2006); In re
Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 684 (Haw. 2004); In re Water Use Permit Applications,
9 P.8d at 466-67 (explaining that the state must apply a "precautionary principle" in protecting
water resources); see also LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, at § 5:57
(summarizing the Hawaii Supreme Court's pronouncements concerning the application of the
public trust doctrine to the conservation of surface water and groundwater within the state).
76. See N.H REv. STAT. ANN. § 481:1 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, S 1390 (2011);
Waiola 0 Moloka4 Inc., 83 P.3d at 668. Legislatures in Michigan and Maine introduced bills
recognizing the public trust doctrine's application to groundwater but ultimately did not enact
either piece of legislation. See H.R. 5319, 95th Leg. (Mich. 2009); H.R. 886, 124th Leg. (Me.
2009).
77. Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 884 (CL
App. 2003) (noting that the public trust doctrine has no direct application to groundwater
sources).
78. Nat' Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983), cert denied sub
nom. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
79. See Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 709 N.W.2d
174, 221-22 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (holding public trust doctrine does not apply to nonnavigable waters); Rettkowski v. State, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993) (noting the court has
never held extended the public trust doctrine to non-navigable waters or groundwater).
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in Ohio amended the state constitution to provide that groundwater and nonnavigable waters "shall not be held in trust by any governmental body.""
D. REQUIREMENTS OF THE ECOLOGICAL PUBLIC TRUST IN THE WATER
MANAGEMENT CONTEXT

An important difference between the new "ecological" public trust cases
and the traditional "public access" cases is the nature of the duty each imposes
on the government and the judicial remedies the doctrine may afford. The
traditional cases protecting public access to trust resources applied substantive
restrictions on activities-private or governmental-in navigable waters that impaired public access to navigable waters." By contrast, the ecological-based
cases have largely avoided substantive commands; instead, the cases have principally imposed proceduralremedies, insisting on consideration and protection of public values, including ecological and other instream interests, to the
extent feasible. 2
The standard articulated in NationalAudubon-consideration and protection of trust values " whenever feasible""-reflects the need to balance instream
interests with consumptive needs."' Feasibility, however, is not an absolute
standard requiring protection of trust resources whenever technically possible;
rather it is a reasonableness standard requiring a determination of whether
protection of instream values is feasible in relation to competing social priori-

80.
OHIO CONsT. art. 1, §19(b)(E) (2008).
81.
See, e.g., In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 196 N.W. 874 (Wis.
1924) (holding that the state did not have power to change navigable waters into agricultural
fields no matter how great the public benefits of doing so); Priewe v. Wis. State Land and Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1896) (overturning state legislature's grant to a private party
of title to a lake bed and permission to drain the lake despite a legislative finding that drainage
was required for public health). Professor Lazarus summarized three types of traditional public
trust cases: (1) those that require that the challenged governmental action satisfy a public trust
purpose; (2) those that require that the disputed action occur only after consideration of any
adverse impact on the trust resource, and then only if such impact is either minimal or necessary; and (3) those that require specific legislative authorization for executive branch agency
decisions. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 651-55. The general rule emanating from the traditional
cases was that the use of trust property (e.g., navigable waters and their shores) was limited to
public trust purposes (e.g., navigation, commerce, or fishing). Effective Judici2/ Intervention,
supra note 49, at 477. Court may allow defeasances of trust resources to private ownership, but
only to promote the natural uses the people traditionally made of the property. Id at 486-89.
For example, Professor Sax explained that the doctrine could allow a private owner to build a
dock on a navigable waterway such as the San Francisco Bay, but not fill the bay for trash disposal or a housing project. Id at 477.
82.
See PublicProperty and the Democratization of Western Water Law, supra note 1, at
590-97 (arguing that recent ecological public trust cases require "fairness and 'reasoned decision-making' from administrators, rather than particular substantive results").
NadAudubon Soc)', 658 P.2d at 728.
83.
84. See id. (holding that the state must "preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by the trust"); see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,
453, 4 53 (Haw. 2000) (noting that the state's duty to consider the public trust "may not readily
translate into substantive results," and that "reason and necessity dictate that the public trust may
have to accommodate off-stream diversions inconsistent with the mandate of protection, to the
unavoidable impairment of public instream uses and values").
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ties." Accordingly, the public trust doctrine should not prohibit private uses of
water resources that impose reasonable burdens on common public values.
Rather, the doctrine imposes an affirmative duty on the government to perform a thorough, fair, and deliberate "hard look" at those values, and to protect them whenever feasible.' This standard is similar to the procedural requirements of many environmental review statues (e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act," the California Environmental Quality Act," or the New
York State Environmental Quality Review Act"), which require public agencies
to demonstrate comprehensive consideration of the environmental impacts of
85. See NatdAudubon Socv, 658 P.2d at 728 ("[als a matter of practical necessity the state
may have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses"); see also
State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Ct. App. 2006) (public trust
does not require that state resolve conflicts in favor of public trust values "whenever possible"
because determination as to feasibility is a matter for the state to decide); Michael C. Blumm,
The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property The Accommodation Principe, 27 PACE
ENVTL. L. REv. 649, 666 (2010) [hereinafter The Public Trust Doctrine and PrivateProperty]
(arguing that although the public trust doctrine has had a transformative effect on private property rights in trust resources to accommodate the protection of public rights, the doctrine has not
eliminated private property tights); Barton H. Thompson, The Public Trust Doctrin: A Conservadve Reconstruction & Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENvTL. LJ. 47, 61 (2006) (discussing
the California Supreme Court's opinion in NatlAudubon Soc'yas a balancing of private interests inherent in the prior appropriation doctrine with the public interests reflected in the public
trust doctrine); Effective.judicial Intervention, supra note 49, at 559-60 (explaining that the
judicial role is not to impose substantive results or usurp legislative or administrative discretion,
but rather to ensure a truly democratic and representative decision-making process); but see
discussion infra Part V.C, reviewing efforts by some advocates to cast the public trust doctrine as
a substantive rather than procedural standard, including the prohibition of particular uses of
water.
86. PublicPropertyand the Democratization of Western Water Law, supra note 1,at 58994 (citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Envt. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). Sax also framed the
public trust doctrine as a common-law form of the "hard-look" doctrine, and argued that the
doctrine compels public bodies to take note of, and properly respond to, shifts in public interest
while also closely scrutinizing government actions to privatize natural resources. See Effective
JudcialIntervention, supra note 49, at 560-63; see also Sax and the Idea of the Public Trus4
supra note 29, at 355.
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331- 4375 (West 2006); Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Nat. Res. Defense
Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) ("Congress in enacting NEPA ... required only that the agency
take a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences before taking a major action.") (citations
omitted).
88. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 2011) [hereinafter CEQA]; PublicProperty and the Democratizaton of Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 591 (stating that the
public trust doctrine's mandate to consider adverse effects and to protect public uses where
feasible in the ecological context is similar to the requirements of CEQA); but see Cynthia L.
Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 583-86 (arguing that the standard required by the public trust
doctrine in the water management context is, in fact, substantive, rather than just procedural,
and that the duty imposed by the doctrine is far more arduous than the requirements of
CEQA).
89. N.Y. ENVYL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (West 2011); Stewart Park & Reserve
Coal., Inc. v. Slater, 352 F.3d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting the court's role "to review the
record to determine if the agency identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a
'hard look' at them, and make a 'reasoned elaboration' of the basis for its determination.")
(citations omitted).
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an agency action and to undertake feasible mitigation efforts." In the water
management context, courts have typically afforded deference to legislative
and regulatory decisions so long as there is sufficient evidence in the record to
demonstrate comprehensive consideration of competing societal interests."

III. THE GOAL IS BALANCED WATER MANAGEMENT
A. MANAGING WATER RESOURCES FOR THE "TRIPLE BOTToM LINE"

To evaluate the public trust doctrine in the context of water management,
it is necessary to define the desired policy goal. In our view, the goal of water
management should be to maximize the social utility stemming from the resource by considering and balancing all social, economic, and environmental
interests-the "triple bottom line." In doing so, water management must also
protect reasonable public and private expectations developed under the applicable legal framework.
Professor Sax advocated the public trust doctrine as a means to protect legitimate, yet underrepresented, public values concerning natural resources
against "rent seeking" by discrete pecuniary interest." In other words, Sax
promoted the public trust doctrine as a means to "balance the scales" by inserting common public interests that states might otherwise wrongly exclude

90. Review of federal agency decisions under the Federal Administrative Procedures Act is
often also undertaken under a "hard look" standard of review. See, e.g., GreaterBoston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851 (supervisory function of the court calls for intervention if the court
"becomes aware . . . that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems.")
Hard look analysis is particularly required when an agency decision "touches on fundamental
personal interests in life, health, and liberty." Enrd.Del Fund,439 F.2d at 598.
91. See e.g., Casitas Municipal Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 459 (2011)
(noting "Iilmplementation of the public trust doctrine requires not only the balancing of the
various public trust values, but also the weighing of those values against other, broader public
interests"); Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 757, 767
(Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to apply the public trust doctrine to modify a water management plan
to enhance environmental values because "a responsible body did weigh and consider the public trust uses of the lake"); Golden Feather Community Ass'n v. Thenualito Irrigation Dist., 257
Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (CL App. 1989) (noting the state's power to accommodate different water
demands and refusing to require the state to elevate fishery protection as an absolute priority
over other uses of water); see also Democracy, Distrust,and the Publc Trus4 supra note 35, at
452 ("Because resource decision making is inherently a technical process that requires the balancing of competing goals, judicial enforcement of these constitutional provisions must refrain
from second-guessing those value balances. Instead, courts must restrict themselves to ensuring
that the government understood and implemented the polity's concern with environmental
conservation"); Thompson, supra note 85, at 69 ("[TIhe public trust doctrine should not override democratic decisions regarding trust assets. To the contrary, courts should employ the
public trust doctrine to aflirm and preserve the authority of the legislative and executive branches over trust assets.").
92. See Liberating the Public Trust Doctrne, supra note 27, at 186-89; PublicProperty
and the Democratzationof Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 582, 590; Joseph Sax and the
Idea of the Public Trust, supra note 29, at 357-58; Effective judicialIntervention, supra note
49, at 473-74.
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from resource management decisions." Sax's premise was understandable in
1970, when he published his seminal public trust article given the emerging
public recognition of environmental exploitation and the relative deficiency of
laws to protect public interests in natural resources as compared to the present." However, as social perceptions have evolved, the policy "pendulum" has
swung meaningfully to vindicate Sax's goals. The federal and state governments have adopted laws to protect environmental values, including those
intended to foster balanced water management and the protection of broader
public values respecting the resource.' As we explain below, such substantive
laws are better suited than the public trust doctrine to balance competing environmental, social, and economic interests."
B. PROTECTING REASONABLE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EXPECTATIONS

As with other natural resources, appropriate protection of reasonable expectations, both public and private, is essential to a balanced and efficient water management policy. As Sax explains, "Itihe essence of property law is respect for reasonable expectations. The idea of justice at the root of private
property protection calls for identification of those expectations which the legal
system ought to recognize."" Sax advocated an ecological application of the
public trust doctrine as a means to infuse consideration of legitimate, yet diffuse, public expectations into the legal system.'
Professor Sax correctly advocated for mutual consideration of reasonable
public and private expectations in the management of natural resources. Applied to water management, we offer the following observations. First, specific
circumstances naturally influence expectations. For instance, a comparatively
minor withdrawal that is unlikely to adversely affect public interests may warrant less scrutiny than larger withdrawals. Second, water management must be
sufficiently adaptable to accommodate evolving social norms and new technical and scientific understanding." Third, this need for adaptability must be
counterbalanced against the desire for legal certainty on which planning and
investments can rely." Last, effective water management policy requires consideration of the "distribution" of regulatory burdens among competing water
users when assessing the reasonableness of private expectations in relation to
93. See EfIecdve judicial hitervention, supa note 49, at 557-65; see also Democracy, Distist,and the Pubc Trust, supia note 35, at 433 ("Despite the technocratic flavor of his conments, the general thirust of Sax's analysis remains toward politics, that is, political ordering,
choices, and access. For Sax, a major goal of the doctrine is to 'equalize' the political playing
field in order to ensure that pro-trust interests be able to attempt to influence the decision makers.").
94. See Effectivejudicial Intervendon, supm note 49, at 473-74.
95. See LAw OF WATER RIGTrrs AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, at S 5:57.
96. See infra Parts IV and V.
97. Lberating the Pubic Trust Doctrine, supra note 27, at 186-87 (citing Frank I. Michaelman, Proper; Utity and Fainess: CommIents on the Ehical Foudation of Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967)).
98. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 27, at 186-89.

99.
100.

See iAfia note 106, and general discussion infra Parts IV.A and IV.F.
See discussion infra notes 103, 104, and 105and accompanming text.
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water management.." In fact, whether a water regulation will withstand a constitutional attack is likely to depend, in large part, upon whether it distributes
regulatory burdens in a manner consistent with reasonable private expectations
relying on the state's underlying framework of water laws.'"
A central tension underlying many water management issues is the competing policy pnionities of legal certainty on one hand and adaptable management on the other. Legal certainty in the reliability of water supplies is important because it streamlines water management and promotes investment in
the resource, including voluntary efficiency upgrades and reallocations of water
from lower to higher-valued uses.'" Conversely, uncertainty can deter sociallyvaluable investments in the resource.'" Sufficient legal certainty is also necessary to support voluntary water transfers, including voluntary reallocations of
water from consumptive to instream uses.'"
Absolute legal certainty (i.e., guaranteed protection of existing allocations),
on the other hand, is neither practical nor efficient.'" The quest for legal certainty cannot come at the expense of the inherent need to adapt and modify
water allocations over time to address changing circumstances, evolving societal goals, and technical understanding."' Private individuals must reasonably

101.

See Dan Tarlock, The Creation ofNew Risk Shanag Water EntitlementRegimes: The

Case of the Truckee-Carson Settlemen4 25 EcOLOGY L.Q. 674, 688-90 (1995) [hereinafter

Creation of New Risk Shanng Water Entitlement Regimesl (describing water rights as a system
of risk allocation among competing users).
102.
See infra Parts IV.F and IV.G.
103.
See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983) (the "doctrine of prior appropriation, the prevailing law in the Western States, is itself largely a product of the compelling need
for certainty in the holding and use of water rights"); see also Changmg Conceptions, supranote
12, at 702 ("Undoubtedly, the most difficult problem facing environmental and natural resources law is to reestablish some level of certainty and security in private interests in natural
resources"); Legal certainty is important in many facets of water management including procedures for acquisition of rights, relations among users and between users and instream interests,
assumption of reductions under shortage conditions, and administrative procedures necessary to
modify management decisions and to resolve conflicts. POSNER, supra note 23, at 68-69; A

Dozen Propositions,supra note 14, at 268.
104.
See, e.g., In re Detennination of Rghts to Waters of Long Valley Creek, 599 P.2d at
666 ("Uncertainty concerning the rights of water users has pernicious effects. Initially, it inhibits
long range planning and investment for the development and use of waters in a stream system. .
Uncertainty also fosters recurrent, costly and piecemeal litigation. . .") (citations omitted).

105. Brian E. Gray, The Shape of Thnngs to Come: A Model Water Transfer Act for California, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 623, 624, 638, 657 (2008).
106.
See POSNER, supia note 23, at 68 ("Economic theory implies that property rights will be
redefined from time to time as the relative values of different uses of land [or in our case water]
change."). Although Posner notes the importance of legal certainty to promote investment and
the potential disutility created by uncertainty on people who are risk adverse, he also acknowledges that "the amount and consequences of uncertainty are easily exaggerated." Id. at 69.
107. We should also acknowledge that optimal water management often requires partial
sacrifice of important societal interests to accommodate other overriding interests as necessary
to maximize overall public welfare. For instance, we may need to tolerate a use that is less than
optimally efficient out ofrespect for water rights priorities and the legal certainty that the priority
system affords. Conversely, we may need to sacrifice legal certainty to allow for reasonable and
necessary adaptability of the management system.
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temper their expectations to accommodate the necessity of adaptive management.
The law's distribution of regulatory burdens among competing water users
provides a means to reconcile this tension between the competing goals of
legal certainty and adaptability." Water users shape their expectations based
upon applicable water laws. Where the state fails to adhere to the legal framework-notably applicable water rights priorities-and thus, violates reasonably
formed expectations, the state is legally vulnerable, including possible takings
liability.'" Conversely, distribution of regulatory burdens pursuant to a transparent water rights system will likely fare better under judicial scrutiny.'
Where the state maintains and adheres to a clear and predictable water rights
system, water users can rely on the legal framework to plan and invest in waterdependent enterprises despite water supply variability caused by natural conditions or adaptive management.'" Thus, the water rights system can afford a
significant degree of legal certainty while, nonetheless, maintaining flexibility to
adjust total, system-wide allocations over time as necessary to accommodate
public interests.
C. PRIVATE RIGHTS IN "PUBLIC" WATER

The law's characterization of property interests in water reflects a balancing of diverse public and private expectations concerning the resource. States
have long deemed naturally-occurring water as "public" property."' In consistent fashion, many state constitutions and statutes declare water to be publicly or state-owned,"' or held in trust by the state,"' although states differ as to.
108. See discussion mfra Parts IV.F, VI.
109. See El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 468, 494
(CL App. 2006) (holding that state could not burden only a senior water right holder in contravention of water rights priority law without sufficient justification). Although the court decided
this case pursuant to an administrative mandamus action, the same reasoning could apply in an
inverse condemnation context. See discussion infraPart IV.G.
110. See MacDonald v. State, 722 P.2d 598, 599 (Mont. 1986) (upholding against takings
claims a statutory change in the quantification format for state water rights from a flow-based
regime to a total allowable diversion quantity even though the change resulted in a lower total
allowable appropriation); Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 204 N.W.2d 105, 107-08
(S.D. 1973) (upholding against takings claims the state's authority to limit the rights of riparian
owners to domestic uses or to uses granted under state's statutory prior appropriation scheme);
see alsodiscussion ifra Part IV.F.
111. For a defense of the prior appropriation doctrine against proposals for water management that rely on bureaucratic reallocation, see Frank J. Trelease, The Model Water Code, the
Wise Administrator,and the Goddam Bureaucra4 14 NAT. RESOURCEsJ. 207, 216 (1974); see
also infa text accompanying notes 262-64.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
113. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, S 5 (property of the public); MONT. CONST. art. LX,
§ 3(3) (property of the state); WYo. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1 (property of the state); CAL. VATER
CODE S 102 (West 2013) (property of the people); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-101 (West 2013)
(property of the state); S.D. CODIED LAws § 46-1-3 (2013) (property of the people); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (West 2013) (property of the public).
114. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. XI, S 1 ("held in trust by the State for the benefit of the
people"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271:20 (2013) ("held in trust by the state for public use");
TEX.1VATER CODE ANN. § 11.0235(a) (West 2013) ("held in trust for the public").
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who is the owner and what they own."' Each state also provides for the right to
use water in the manner provided by state law, often in the same statutes characterizing water as publicly or state-owned."'
There is well-settled accord among the states that a water right, regardless
of type, is a usufructuary right; a water right only conveys a right to use water
on a recurring basis."' Usufructuary water rights are nonetheless property interests that afford rights to control, consume, earn income from, and, in many
cases, transfer the entitlement."' Thus, as a species of property, the Constitution affords water rights protection from government expropriation."' Gov-

115. CompareCOLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5 ("every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated"), with MONT. CONST. art. IX, S 3(3) ("all surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric
waters"), and with WYo. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1 ("all natural streams, springs, lakes or other
collections of still water"). See also, Government Ownership, supra note 18, at 642 (evaluating
differences in statutory and constitutional treatment of water "ownership" among several states
and explaining that "[ijf real differences were intended by the framers of these varying statements, the courts have failed to find them and have blurred the distinctions").
116. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, S 13 ("All surface and subsurface waters reserved to
the people for common use ... are subject to appropriation."); N. M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2
("The unappropriated water of every natural stream, perennial or torrential, within the state of
-New Mexico, is hereby declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for
beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of the state."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A)
(2013) (West) ("[Wlaters of all sources ... belong to the public and are subject to appropriation
and beneficial use as provided in this chapter."); CAL. WATER CODE S 102 (West 2013) ("All
water within the State is the property of the people of the State, but the right to the use of water
may be acquired by appropriation in the manner provided by law."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S
90.03.010 (West 2013) ("[All waters within the state belong to the public, and ... shall be
hereafter acquired only by appropriation for a beneficial use . . .").
117. See, e.g., Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Zanker, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167, 170 n.2 (Ct. App.
2006) ("Water itself is not subject to ownership in California by private parties. Instead, a party
can own the right to use water."); Vill. of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 667
(Fla. 1979) ("The right of the owner to ground water underlying his land is to the usufruct of the
water and not to the water itself."); In re Application U-2, 413 N.W.2d 290, 298 (Neb. 1987)
("The protected right of landowners is the right to the use of groundwater, and does not reach
the ownership of the water itself."); see also City of Denver v. Bayer, 2 P. 6, 7 (Colo. 1883);
Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708, 711 (S.D. 1964).
118. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) ("[Olnce rights to use water are acquired, they become vested property rights. As such,
they cannot be infringed by others or taken by governmental action without due process and just
compensation."); King v. White, 499 P.2d 585, 588 (Wyo. 1972) ("A water right is a 'property
right of high order,' with 'none of the characteristics of personal property,' and it is real property."); Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 29 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Idaho
1934) ("A water right is real property and may be sold and transferred separately from the land
upon which it has been used, the same as any other real property.") (quoting In re Rice, 299 P.
664, 666 (Idaho 1931)); Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 114 Ohio St.
685, 696 (1926) ("A water right is a species of property in and of itself...");see also Norman K.
Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey ofthe Evolution of Western Water Law in Response
to Chanming Economic and Publc Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 351 (1989)
("[Ain appropriative water right, once vested, became a constitutionally protected property
interest. It could be sold, leased, or transferred in other ways. It was a usufructuary right, or a
right to use, and was protected as a property right.").
119. Wash. Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1054-55 (Wash. 1993) ("A vested
water right is a type of private property that is subject to the Fifth Amendment prohibition on
takings without just compensation."); see also discussion infa Part IV.G.
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ernment agencies also frequently treat water rights as property for other purposes, such as taxation."
On the other hand, constitutional or statutory expressions of public ownership or state trusteeship of water does not afford the state a propietaryownership interest in natural waters. Rather, such expressions simply reflect the
state's sovereign regulatory control over water resources." For this reason,
when a public agency seeks to obtain water for a proprietary purpose, such as
for a park or to purvey water to others, it cannot take the desired water at will;
it must comply with applicable state laws and procedures to obtain a water
right in the same manner as any other user."
The duality of pubhc control of water combined with private ights to use
water reflects the resource's unique physical attributes and vast societal importance." Water rights support public and private consumptive water uses
essential to the public welfare. Yet property rights in water are interests in a
shared resource that impact diverse and often countervailing public interests."
The state must therefore regulate water use to curb waste, promote and protect the public's interest in the use of water, and mitigate negative externalities
of water use."

120. The tax assessor may separately assess water rights depending on the tax regime of a
particular state. See, e.g., In re Assessment of Taxes, Booth, 15 Haw. 516, 516 (Haw. 1904);
CAL. S'rrE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ASSESSORS' HANDBOOK S 542 ASSESSMENT OF WATER
COMPANIES AND WATER RIGHTS, PART II: ASSESSMENT OF WATER RIGHTS 6 (2000), available

at http://www.boe.ca.gov/proptaxes/pdf/ah542.pdf. Similarly, water rights owners may exchange
their water rights for like-kind property pursuant to section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code.
See Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295.
121. State v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 285-87 (Ct. App.
2000) (construing a state statute declaring all waters to be the property of the people as indicative
of the state's sovereign control of water resources and not proprietary ownership); Walbridge v.
Robinson, 125 P. 812, 814 (Idaho 1912) (a state's interest or title to water is not "in the proprietary sense, but rather in the sovereign capacity as representative of all the people for the purpose
of guaranteeing that the common rights of all are protected . . ."); Willey v. Decker, 73 P. 210,
221-22 (Wyo. 1903) (holding that an expression that the water is the property of the public
denotes a state's sovereignty over the resource as a representative of the people and does not
indicate proprietary owner).
122. See, e.g., Supedor Court of Riverside Cnty., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285; see also City of
Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 860 n.7 (Cal. 2000).

123. David B. Anderson, Water Rights as Property hi Tulare v. United States, 38
McGEORGE L. REv. 461, 473-74 (2007) (noting that "[wlater rights do not, as a species of property, fall within our normal sense and everyday understanding about property in land and chattels" because water is "neither static nor well-defined," and that for this reason, "water ill-fits
property's foundational concept of possession and defies the very order and predictability" that
are intended from designated property rights); Gray, supra note 16, at 4 (discussing the various
physical and legal factors that render water rights a unique form of property and "seldom affect
real property and other property rights").
124. See Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (Cal. 1935); Gray, supranote 16, at 4125. See, e.g., Pac. Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 449 (1916) ("Water rights, like all
other rights, are subject to such reasonable regulations as are essential to the general welfare,
peace and good order of the citizens of the state, to the end that the use of water by one, however absolute and unqualified his right thereto, shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others entitled to the equal privilege of using water from the same source, nor injurious to the
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Rhetorical emphasis on competing property characterizations of water or
water rights is largely devoid of sophisticated analysis. The balancing of reasonable public and private expectations should ultimately define the scope of
property interests in water.'" The notion of public ownership of water does not
provide helpful guidance to clarify and balance public and private expectations.
We should clarify that our argument is focused only on the management
of the allocation and use of water. The notion of "public property" may be
appropriate as a definition of lands and resources that the state should preserve for open access by the public." However, with respect to the use and
conservation of water resources (apart from physical access to surface water
bodies), a fictitious characterization of water as public property is unnecessary
and confusing and detracts from the development of substantive water management policy.'"

IV. BALANCED WATER MANAGEMENT DOES NOT NEED THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
As discussed above, the legal fiction of water as public "property" once
served an important public interest by establishing an analogue to private
property, when legal protections were largely centered on private property
interests." Although debate will naturally continue regarding the extent to
which government should intrude into the autonomy of private property," the
law's shift away from a classical liberal approach to property law--with its traditional bias for personal autonomy over collective interests-is undeniable.'

rights of the public.") (quoting In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505, 514 (Or. 1914); see also discussion infra Parts IV.C-F.
126. See discussion wha Parts IV.F-G. The legal understanding of private property interests
in natural resources has substantially evolved to accommodate regulatory oversight to protect
reasonable public expectations. As Professor Lazarus observed, "modem trends in natural
resources law increasingly have eroded traditional concepts of private property rights in natural
resources and substituted new notions of sovereign power over those resources." Lazarus, supra
note 12, at 633.
127. See Thompson, supra note 85, at 62 (arguing that "some degree of common property is
essential in a nation in which private property is (rightfully) dominant. A world in which all land
and resources are privatized would be not only unworkable from a utilitarian perspective but
socially weaker."); see also Comedy of the Commons, supra note 12, at 722-23, 775-81 (discussing the important role and socializing effect of public property in the historical and modem
context).
128. See Thompson, supra note 85, at 64 ("The public trust doctrine, however, loses much
of its animation, strength, and unique justification if and when it moves beyond its traditional
focus on balancing private and common property and turns instead to purely environmental
considerations."); see also discussion i/ia Part V.
129. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
130. See A Dozen Propositions,supra note 14, at 273-87; Lazarus, supra note 12, at 66872, 674; see also Frazier,supra note 10, at 365-66 (1995); Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property:
An Essay, 100 YALE LJ. 127, 128-29 (1990).
131. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 668 ("The relationship of the sovereign police power to
private property has been marked by the steady erosion of private property's sanctity in the face
of the sovereign police power's growth.").
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Building from early cases such as Eucld v. Ambler," the law has evolved to
recognize the legitimacy of government police powers to enact laws and regulations to protect diffuse public interests directly." In our increasingly populated
and interconnected society, the very contours of what constitutes property
have adapted to accommodate reasonable regulatory intrusions necessary for
protection of broad public interests." This significant legal shift has supplanted
the need for a legal fiction of public property in natural resources." Thus, a
state may act upon its ample police powers to manage water resources in a
manner that effectively balances diverse and competing interests in the resource."
A. THE REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL USE DOCTRINE PROVIDES A MORE
DIRECT MEANS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST

A core tenet of virtually all state water management laws is the requirement that users must put water to beneficial purposes by reasonable means.'
The specific terms used among the states vary between "reasonable," "benefi132. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (upholding comprehensive zoning law as a valid exercise of municipal police powers).
133. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962) (denying a takings
claim relating to a safety regulation that prohibited operation of a previously legal sand and
gravel pit in a suburban area because the regulation was a reasonable and a non-compensable
exercise of a city's police power); accordGorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927) (upholding
city setback ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power); but see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.3 (1987) (criticizing the reasoning in Goldblatt for assuming that
due process, equal protection, and takings clause analyses are the same with respect to the level
of scrutiny of property regulations). See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124-25, 131 (1978) (discussing regulations that the courts upheld despite "substantial individualized harm" to property owners). See alsoJohn Leshy, A ConversationAbout Takings and
WaterRigts, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1985, 2000-2003 (2005).
134. See A Dozen Propositions,supra note 14, at 273-87. Rose provides an apt example of
the evolution of common law protection of public interests into statutory protections, specifically
with respect to pigsties in expanding urban communities. Id. at 274. She notes that as cities
grew, the noise and smell of pigsties increasingly became the target of nuisance suits, but that
such suits are now virtually nonexistent because general public legislation about animal husbandry in urban areas has superseded such nuisance actions. Id.
135. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 657-64, 679-91 (arguing that developments in the law,
including liberalized standing requirements, growth of administrative law and procedure, and
expanded application of the nuisance doctrine and tort law have supplanted the need for the
ecological public trust doctrine as a basis for judicial review of government decisions relating to
natural resources).
136. See discussion infra Parts IV.A and IV.C. Water management is largely a state affair.
See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAw IN A NUTSHELL 372 (4th ed. 2009).
137. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, S 13; CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; N.M. CONsT. art.
XVI, § 3; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(a) (2013) (West); FLA. STAT. §§ 373.019(16),
.223(1) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-91 (West 2013); HAw. REV. STAT. § 174-49(a) (2013);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-104 (West 2013); 525 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6 (2013); IND. CODE S 1425-1-1 (2013); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 151.110(l)(a) (West 2013); Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-1
(West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-702 (2012); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.035 (West 2012);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-215.12 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-01.2 (2013); OR.
REv. STAT. § 537.525(3) (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-4, -8 (2013); TEx. WATER CODE
ANN. § 11.025 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-1-3, 73-3-1(4) (West 2013); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 41-3-101 (West 2013).
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cial," or "reasonable and beneficial."'" The meaning and legal requirements of
the terms "reasonable" and "beneficial" vary among the states." Some states
require that the state's limited water supplies "be put to beneficial use to the
fullest extent of which they are capable."" Other states provide that beneficial
use defines the scope of a water right."' In general, such standards-which for
simplicity we refer to as the "beneficial use requirement"-prohibit unreasonable or wasteful uses of water deemed contrary to the public interest."' Accordingly, there is no property interest in a use that does not comport with the
beneficial use requirement."
The beneficial use requirement has evolved with social norms.'" Historically, the requirement largely focused on the avoidance of wasteful uses of
water given the scarcity of supply, particularly in western states.'" Modern application of the beneficial use requirement arguably includes consideration of
See 1 JOSEPH W. DELIAPENNA, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 9.03(b)(1)-(2)
138.
REGULATED RIPARIANIsM (Amy K. Kelly ed., 3rd ed. LexisNexis 2013) [hereinafter Regulated
Ripaananism];see also discussion infra notes 136-37.
139. Regulated Riparianism, supra note 138, SS 9.03(b)(1)-(2). Dellapenna discusses variations in the use of the terms "reasonable" and "beneficial," as well as definitions of such terms
provided by the Model Water Code, the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code, and by certain states. He further explains that many states express preferences for various uses and criteria
to be applied by administrative agencies in management of water resources that may, in effect,
act as a proxy for definitions of these terms.
140. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; GA. CODE ANN. S 12-5-91 (West 2013); Miss. CODE ANN. §
51-3-1 (West 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-215.12 (West 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-520 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-4 (2013).
141. -N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3 ("Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit
of the right to the use of water."). Laws of several other states have nearly identical language.
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-62-101, art. III, S (b)(2) (West 2013); NEv. REv. STAT. §
533.035 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-01.2 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.2(A) (2013);
OR. REv. STAT. § 537.525(3) (West 2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-8 (2013); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 73-1-3 (West 2013); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (West 2013).
142. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-1 (West 2013); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws S 46-1-4 (2013).
143. E.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28 (West 2013);
OR. REv. STAT. S 540.610 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-4.5 (West 2013); see also Steven J.
Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law A Blueprint for Change, 61 OR. L. REv. 483, 487-88
(1982).
144. See In re Water of Long Valley Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 665 (Cal. 1979) ("a reasonable use of water varies with the facts and circumstances of the particular case"); Joslin v. Marin
Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1967) ("a reasonable use of water depends on circumstances of each case"); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45
P.2d 972, 1007 (Cal. 1935) ("What is a beneficial use at one time may, because of changed
conditions, become a waste of water at a later time."); Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v.
Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174, 194-95 (Mich. CL App. 2005) (reasonableness is
determined by whether the use of water by one user is reasonable and consistent with a corresponding use by others); In re Water Right Claim No. 1927-2, 524 N.W.2d 855, 858 (S.D.
1994) (explaining that beneficial use is an evolving concept that can be expanded consistent with
changing societal values).
145. See generallyGETCHES, supra note 136, at 137-38; see also Tulare Irrigation Dist. v.
Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal. 1935) (holding that field flooding to
exterminate rodents was wasteful and non-beneficial); Blaine Cnty. Inv. Co. v. Mays, 291 P.
1055 (Idaho 1930) (holding that flooding to form ice to preserve soil moisture was not beneficial).
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environmental and other social values." Specifically, one may argue that in
order to put water to beneficial use "to the fullest extent ... capable,""7 for the
"best utilization,"" or "consistent with the best interests of the people,""' it is
necessary to consider and balance the full range of costs and benefits of .all
potential uses of water." Social, economic, and environmental concerns are
each important considerations, as each carries definite public value.'
The beneficial use requirement has historically had more influence ensuring consideration of public interests in relation to the initiation of new water
uses (e.g., pursuant to a permit application) than influencing efforts to force
reallocation of water from existing uses.' To date, courts have been reluctant
to limit an existing and ongoing water use on the grounds that the use is no
longer beneficial in light of alternative and more beneficial water uses." Such
judicial reluctance is arguably justifiable because the courts must balance the
benefits of water reallocation against the uncertainty and disutility resulting
from reallocation under the pretext of "comparative beneficial use."" However, pursuant to the beneficial use requirement, courts may nonetheless curtail
existing water uses that substantially impair the public interest or that constitute
a public nuisance." A water right holder cannot assert a right to use water in a

146. See ROBERT E. BECK & OWEN L. ANDERSON, Elements of Pnor Appropiation, in
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs, § 12.02(c)(2) (Amy L. Kelly ed., 4th ed. Lexis Nexis/Matthew
Bender 2011) [hereinafter Elements ofPnorAppropiatdon].
147. CAL. CONST. art. X, S 2 (West, 2013).
148. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-6(3) (West, 2013).
149. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 61-04-01.1 (West 2013).
150. Trelease, supra note 111, at 4 (noting that "Iwlhat is to be maximized is welfare from
water use, not water use itself").
151. See, e.g., Coto. REv. STAT. ANN. S 37-92-103(4) (West, 2013) (defining "beneficial
use" to include appropriations for instream recreational and environmental uses); HAw. REV.
STAT. S 174C-3 (West 2013) (defining instream uses as beneficial uses of water for instream
purposes and listing examples); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-10(b) (defining "beneficial use" to
include instream uses and listing examples); Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout
Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 314 (Colo. 2007) ("Maximum utilization does not mean that every
ounce of Colorado's natural stream water ought to be appropriated; optimum use can be
achieved only through proper regard for all significant factors, including environmental and
economic concerns."); State v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 928 (Idaho 1974)
(aesthetic and recreational uses are beneficial uses even though not included in a list of beneficial uses set forth in state constitution).
152. See Gregory A. Thomas, Conservbn Aquatc Biodiversity: A Cridcal Companson of
Legal Tools for Augmenbng Streamlows in Cahfonia, 15 STAN. ENvTL. LJ. 3, 27-31 (1996);
see, e.g., State of Wash. Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993) (acknowledging state policy to balance consumptive and instream interests, but refusing to include impacts
on flora and fauna as factors for setting allowable withdrawals within a general stream adjudication, reasoning that such factors cannot operate to impair existing water rights).
153. See GETCHES, supra note 136, at 137-38.
154. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (discussing the importance and social
benefit that stem from legal certainty in relation to water rights); see also 2flia notes 262 and
264.
155. See e.g., Natl Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 728 n.28 (Cal. 1983) (acknowledging an argument by the California Attorney General that the state water board could
review water rights harmful to the public interest for curtailment pursuant to the beneficial use
doctrine).
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way that fails to comport with the beneficial use requirement." Furthermore,
the legislature may specify uses or circumstances that would not comport with
the beneficial use requirement" thus empowering the judiciary and regulatory
agencies to curtail existing uses deemed by the legislature to be unreasonable
or non-beneficial.
State actions that enforce the beneficial use requirement to balance instream and consumptive demands will generally not incur takings liability because no water right exists for non-beneficial uses. Thus, a user may not claim
inverse condemnation if the user is applying the water right to a non-beneficial
use." As the Supreme Court of Washington explained:
A vested water right is a type of private property that is subject to the Fifth
Amendment prohibition on takings without just compensation. Nevertheless,
the concept of "beneficial use", as developed in the common law .. . operates as a permissible limitation on water rights."
To the extent application of the public trust doctrine to water resource
management demands only thorough procedural consideration of the feasibility of protecting instream interests (as opposed to substantive results),'" the
beneficial use requirement and the public trust doctrine impose the same procedural bar. The beneficial use requirement, however, is preferable because it
does not rely on legal fiction, ambiguous standards, and narrow doctrinal constraints." Unlike the public trust doctrine, the beneficial use requirement also
does not present the risk of arbitrary favoritism for particular uses." Rather,
the beneficial use requirement demands a candid and fact-specific assessment
of potential water management options to determine which will best advance
the public welfare."
B. RIPARIANISM AND PRIOR APPROPRIATION

Aside from the core beneficial use requirement, states employ diverse water management approaches. Eastern states, which have historically enjoyed
ample water supplies, have traditionally adhered to a riparian doctrine of water
156. Elements ofPnorAppropdation, supm note 146, § 12.02(c)(2). Such a result is similar
to applications of the public nuisance doctrine as a basis for judicial intervention with respect to
environmental and natural resource problems in general. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 660-64.
157. Elements ofPnorAppropiation,supra note 146, § 12.02(c) (2).
158. See discussion infra Part IV.F.
159. Wash. Dept. of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1054-55 (Wash. 1993) (citing
Wash. Dept. of Ecology v. Adsit, 694 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1985)).
160. See discussion supraPart II.D.
161. See discussion i2/ia Parts V.B and V.D.
162. See discussion M2/a Part V.C.
163. See, e.g., United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 188 (CL
App. 1986) (holding that the state water board has broad power to prevent unreasonable methods of use, which includes balancing between water quality and diversions of water for consumptive uses); Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles, 181 P.3d 252, 260 (Colo. 2008) (holding that the
state requirement that water be put to optimal use requires the state to provide proper regard for
all significant factors, including environmental and economic concerns).
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use derived from English common law."' The riparian doctrine generally imposes reciprocal rights and obligations on landowners abutting a water body,
whereby each riparian landowner possesses the right to withdraw water from
the abutting water body for reasonable uses." Similar principles govern
groundwater use in these states. Landowners overlying a source of groundwater possess rights to withdraw groundwater as a right appurtenant to land ownership." Many riparian states, however, have adopted regulatory and permitting schemes that modify many of the limitations inherent in the riparian doctrine."
Western states have repudiated the riparian doctrine in favor of the prior
appropriation doctrine because of water scarcity and the need for non-riparian
water uses." Prior appropriation, which originated from western mining camps
in the 19' century West," does not limit withdrawals to riparian landowners.
Instead, it mandates that users obtain water rights through historic use and
prioritizes water rights based on the date of initial appropriation."' Earlier appropriators are granted priority to available water over later appropriators."'
C. STATE PERMITTING AND REGULATORY OVERSIGHT

As water scarcity, growing population, and emerging environmental values
have led to increased water conflicts, states have adopted more robust permitting and oversight systems. All western states, except Colorado, utilize administrative permitting systems to control the acquisition, use, transfer, and termination of water rights."' Hawaii and many eastern states have also modified
common law riparianism in favor of "regulated riparianism," which incorporates various permitting schemes."' Although permitting systems are more
164. See Iw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, S 1:1.
165. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 505 (1945); Harris v. Brooks,
283 S.W.2d 129, 133-34 (Ark. 1955); Carlsbad Mut. Water Co. v. San Luis Rey Dev. Co., 178
P.2d 844, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); see generally Regulated R arianism, supra note 138, S
6.01.
166. RegulatedRiananism,supra note 138, §§ 22.02-.03; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 858 (2013).
167. See, e.g. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.042 (West 2011).
168. Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, supra note 118, at 348-49; 1 WELLS
HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 1-144 (1974); see
GETCHES, supra note 136, at 272-73. California applies a hybrid of the two legal regimes. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 864 (Cal. 1980); Lux v. Haggin, 4 P. 919, 923-24 (Cal. 1884).
169. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140; 140 (Cal. 1855); see also Charles F. Wilkinson, Western
Water Lawi Transition,56 U. COLO. L. REv. 317, 318-320 (1985).
170. Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 24 (Ct. App. 1998).
171. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1148 (Colo. 2001); Am.
Falli Reservoir Dist No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 154 P.3d 433, 438 (Idaho 2007).
172. See LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 5:44. Colorado administers water rights through the judiciary by means of a "water court," with assistance from the
state engineer. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (West 2013); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs
of Cnty. of Arapahoe v. Collard, 827 P.2d 546, 551 (Colo. 1992).
173. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-210 to -219 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
22a-368 to -374 (West 2013); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001-6031 (West 2013); FLA. STAT.
ANN. 55 373.216, 373.219 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. S 12-5-31(b)(1) (2013); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 174C-27 (2013); see alsoJoseph W. Dellapenna, Special Challenges to Water Markets
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common and comprehensive for surface water, states continue to develop and
strengthen groundwater permitting programs as well."'
Permitting statutes generally require the state's permitting agency to consider broad public interests prior to issuing or modifying a permit, including
protection of minimum streamflow or aquifer levels for environmental and
other instream purposes." Generally, the state may deny a water right application or condition the grant of any permit as it deems appropriate to protect the
public interest."
States routinely rely on various other water management laws as well. Examples include laws pertaining to: local or system-wide planning, monitoring,
data collection and reporting,'" maximum total withdrawals,' management
L, Ripanan States, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 305, 314-35 (2004) (hereinafter Special Challenges];
LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 3:90; George W. Sherk, Eastern

Water Law Trendsm State Legislaon, 9VA. ENvTL. Lj. 287, 291-92 (1990).
174. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 324.32723 (2008) (requiring a permit for large quantity
withdrawals and other specified circumstances); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §1020.9 (West 2011)
(allocating groundwater resources among overlying landowners by a percentage formula); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 49-5-60 (2013) (requiring groundwater withdrawal permits in designated capacity
use areas); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1418 (2013) (requiring groundwater withdrawal permit for
daily withdrawals in excess of 57,600 gallons); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.050 (West
2013) (requiring a permit to withdraw groundwater, albeit with numerous exceptions to the
permitting requirement). See generally LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note

22, § 4.28.
175. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.080(b)(1)-(8) (2010); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45153 (2010); CAL. WATER CODE SS 1253-1259 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.042 (West
2011); HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-49(4) (2010); see also Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 448-49
(Idaho 1985) (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1501 and requiring the Director of Water Resources to consider factors such as protection of fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, aesthetic
beauty; and water quality in assessing an application for water rights); Stempel v. Dep't of Water
Res., 508 P.2d 166, 172 (Wash. 1973) (citing WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.54.020(3) in holding that the protection of the quality of the natural environment must be a condition to issuance
of water use permit). See generallyLAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, §
5:52.
176. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (state may deny permit if denial is "demanded by
the public interest"); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203A(5)
(2010) (director of Department of Water Resources may grant, deny or condition pennit for
appropriative permit); IOWA CODE § 455B.267 (authority to deny permit if withdrawal would
impair navigability of a water body, the long-term availability of water from a ground or surface
water source, or otherwise adversely affect the public health or welfare); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46234, -235 (2010); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. S 533.370 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-7
(West 2010); OR. REv. STAT. § 537.153 (West 2010); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.03.290
(West 2010); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.147 (Vernon 2010) (providing for analysis of impacts on bays, estuaries, and aquatic life in denying or approving permit to appropriate water);
MD. CODE ANN. § 5-507; N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAw § 15-1501(4); Central Platte Natural
Res. Dist. v. City of Fremont, 549 N.W.2d 112, 118 (1996) (holding that protection of endangered whooping crane was in the public interest and justified denial of water permit). See also
LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 5:52; George A. Gould, A WesternerLooks at Eastern Water Law Reconsidertion of PnorAppropriaionin the East; 25 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 89, 93 (2002). The state can also expressly condition a permit to
yield to later-in-time modifications. CAL. CODE REGs., tit. 23 §780 (2013).
177. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10610, 10610.4 (West 1992) (enacting the Water
Management Planning Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-351, -352 (2011) (authorizing a ten-year
program of detailed geological and hydrological studies); MASS. GEN. LAvs ANN. ch. 21G, S 3
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criteria for specific water sources," instream flows for fish habitat," preferential uses,"' well drilling,' water supply showings for land use approvals," use of
reclaimed water," and water right transfers." Additionally, environmental review statutes, such as the California Environmental Quality Act and the New
York State Environmental Quality Review Act ensure that government agencies fully consider environmental impacts to water resources when approving
water withdrawals or other projects affecting water resources."
Some state water management laws are far from comprehensive, and
some are in need of refinement."' However, the states possesses ample police
powers to manage water resources to protect the public interest without relying
on the public trust doctrine.
D. WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

The courts may also play a significant role in water management through
water rights adjudications." The courts possess the power to adjudicate water
(West 1985) (enacting Massachusetts Water Management Act); MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. §
324.32725 (West 2008) (encouraging the creation of a water users committee to evaluate water
trends within a watershed and to assist in water management planning).
178. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-319 (West 2010) (generally prohibiting withdrawals
from highly-appropriated basins and subbasins); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:22-7 (West 2001) (prohibiting withdrawals from the Raritan River when river flow is less than a certain rate).
179. ALA. CODE § 9-10B-21 (1993) (providing for declaration of capacity stress areas when
demands exceed supply and for the promulgation of rules to protect public interests); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-411 to -421 (2010) (designating Arizona's active groundwater management areas and criteria).
180. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE S 1257.5 (West 2011). See generallyJesseA. Boyd, Note,
Hip Deep: A Survey of State Instream Flow Law From the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific
Ocean, 43 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 1151 (2003) (discussing how one may change instream flows in
Rocky Mountains, Great Basin, and Pacific states to benefit the fishery resource).
181. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (ranking water use priorities in times of shortage);
CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 2010) (declaring water for domestic purposes as the highest
use of water, followed by irrigation use).
182. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-91-101 to -113 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
19a-209a (West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-1(4)(b) (West 1953).
183. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10910-10912, 10914-10915 (West 2002); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.27.097 (West 2010).
184. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13550-13557 (West 2009). See-generally Ginette
Chapman, Note, From Toilet to Tap: the Growmg Use of Reclaimed Water and the Legal
System's Response, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 773 (2005) (explaining various water reuses).
185. See e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725, 1735 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §
105.22 (West 2011). See generally George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party
Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1 (1988); LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra
note 22, §§ 5:71-5:85.
186. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 2011); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
M 8-0101 to 8-0117 (Gould 2011).
187. See LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 3:97 (arguing that eastern state permit systems often present a confusing and vague mix of permitting criteria between
property rights protection and administrative allocation, and that as a result such systems fail to
define with any precision the public interest in water management).
188. See, e.g., Wash. Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993); In re the
Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992). See generally Stuart T. Waldrip, Water
Rghts-Finahty of General Adjudication Proceedings in the Seventeen Western States, 1966
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rights and establish water management plans pursuant to statutory procedures,
the state's beneficial use requirements, and inherent legal and equitable powers vested in the courts." Many states provide a statutory process for initiation
and processing of comprehensive adjudications by a state water management
agency, followed by judicial review and adoption of the agency's recommended decree (with or without modification by the court).'" Adjudication decrees
typically limit or condition withdrawals with respect to both the resource as a
whole and individually by each water right holder. In so doing, the adjudication may cap water withdrawals, which, in some states, may not otherwise be
possible."' Most decrees also reserve jurisdiction for the court to monitor and
impose new orders, resolve future disputes, and amend the judgment as necessary to adapt the management plan to changing conditions or water supply
needs."
Adjudication decrees often also impose a comprehensive management
plan that is tailored to the unique physical conditions of the water source and
local water needs." In some circumstances, more effective and efficient management is possible pursuant to a judicially-fashioned management plan than
under generally applicable laws."
E. THE STATE'S POLICE POWER PROVIDES AMPLE AUTHORITY TO
MANAGE THE INITIATION OF NEW WATER WITHDRAWALS

As discussed, states possess ample police powers to impose water management laws to balance competing water demands and ensure the resource's
long-term sustainability." The states possess robust powers to restrict and condition initiation of new water withdrawals," limited only by constitutional

UTAH L. REV. 152; Scorr S. SLATER, CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND PoucY
(2011) [hereinafter WATER LAW AND PoucY].

§ 9.09, 9.10

189. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (2013) (defining "plan of augmentation");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-234 (2013) (describing elements of adjudication required by statute);
Cal. Am. Water v. City of Seaside, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 529, 536 (Ct. App. 2010). (discussing
implementation of a "physical solution" as an equitable remedy).
190. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2500-2868 (West 2013) (as applied to surface water);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 539.005-.220 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. SS 42-1406, 42-1412
(West 1994). See generaly A. Lynne Krogh, Water Right Adjudications in the Western States:
Procedures Constitutionality, Problems & Solutions, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV 12, 19-21
(1995).
191. See, e.g., In re Water of Long Valley Creek, 599 P.2d 656, 665-69 (Cal. 1979).
192. See, e.g., Cent. & W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. S. Cal. Water Co., 135 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 486, 491-92 (Ct. App. 2003).
193. See, e.g., Cal.Am. Water, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 532-33, 536.
194. See, e.g., Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 665-69 (subordinating the priority of unused riparian rights within a general stream adjudication to eliminate the legal uncertainty caused by the
potential activation of unquantified riparian rights under the state's common law); but see A.
Dan Tarlock, The Illusion of Finatyin General Water Rights Adjudications, 25 IDAHO L.
REV. 271 (1989) (arguing that adjudications are expensive, controversial, and often do not
achieve finality with respect to water rights).
195. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
196. See e.g., Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist.
77 P.3d 62, 77-78 (Colo. 2003).
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boundaries." In fact, generally, there is no protected expectation that a court
will grant a new water right.'"Thus, constitutional restraints are unlikely to burden reasonable and even-handed regulation of new water rights.'"
F. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IS NOT NEEDED TO REDIRECT AND
REALLOCATE EXISTING WATER USES WITHOUT INCURRING TAKINGS
LIABILITY

Water management cannot be static if it is to serve the public interest. Old
allocation decisions must be susceptible to modification to accommodate. new
scientific and technical understanding, as well as evolving perceptions of the
public interest. Some champion the public trust doctrine as a perceived basis
for the state to reallocate or restrict existing water rights without incurring takings liability.' However, as explained below, the public trust doctrine should
have no bearing on takings analysis. Rather, a takings analysis should consider
reasonable public and private expectations undistorted by legal fictions." As
long as the state adheres to water management protocols that do not violate
reasonable private expectations, the state should not be liable." On the other
hand, the public trust doctrine should not shield the state from takings liability
where such liability would otherwise arise."

197. See e.g., Sporhase v. Neb. ex rel. Douglas, 485 U.S. 941, 951 (1982) (holding that state
water regulations must comport with the dormant commerce clause).
198. Catherland Reclamation Dist. v. Lower Platte N. Natural Res. Dist., 433 N.W.2d 161,
166 (Neb. 1988) (holding that a water right applicant has no property right in a mere application
for water rights); Vill. of Tequesta v.Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 667 (Fla. 1979) (holding that a potential user does not obtain property right in water until he or she diverts water and
applies it to beneficial use).
199. See e.g., Omernik v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734, 741-43 (Wis. 1974) (upholding permitting requirement from equal protection challenge). See generallyRegulated Ripananism, supra
note 138, §§ 9.04(a)-(b).
200. The reasoning of those arguing such views is that the trust imposes a public servitude on
all water rights and, thus, subordinates the privileges of a water right holder to state actions that
serve the purpose of furthering the public interest. On this basis, some may argue that there is
no compensation requirement where the state restricts private use of a trust resource because
the public trust - the jus pubhcurn - burdens a title to a trust resource - the jus pivatum, and
therefore, no liability will arise where the state takes action to fulfill its trust responsibilities. See
Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 584-87;
Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evoling Pubhlic Trust in Western
Water,37 ARiz. L. REv. 701, 709-10 (1995). Therefore, some may argue that the state does not
recognize vested rights as against a subsequent exercise of the trust PubEc Propertyand the
Democratizationof Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 584-85; see also LAw OF WATER
RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 5:58 (noting that "Itihe major impact of the public
trust doctrine is its potential to require retroactive reallocation," and discussing the takings question in relation to retroactive imposition of the public trust doctrine).
201. A Fish Out of Water, supra note 1, at 560; see discussion imbra Part IV.G. For a discussion of the social and economic costs of using the public trust doctrine to avoid compensation of
government takings, see Scott Andrew Shepard, The Unbearable Cost of Skipping the Check:
PropertyRights, Takings Compensation & Ecological Protection in the Western Water Law
Contex4 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 1063, 1111-34 (2009).
202. See izh notes 211-222 and accompanying text.
203. See ifiaPart IV.G.
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Determining whether a government restriction of a water right amounts to
an uncompensated taking is a difficult legal inquiry. As Professor Tarlock observes, "Itihe determination of when a government action is or is not a taking
is one of the most intractable problems of modem jurisprudence and on
which little consensus exists either at the philosophical or the doctrinal level.""'
These complexities are heightened in the water management context because
there is little guiding precedent."' Additionally, takings law in the real property
context is often incongruous to takings inquiries concerning water regulations."' For example, should courts evaluate a mandatory withdrawal reduction
to a water right under either of the two per se taking tests, i.e., the Loretto
physical takings test and the Lucas elimination of all economically beneficial or
productive use test?"' Or, should courts evaluate the mandatory reduction
under the multifactor balancing test applied in Penn CentraP" Also, how does
this inquiry apply to a water right for which the entire advantage is the right to
temporarily use a given quantity of water on a recurring basis?"' If the Lucas
test applies to water rights,' the analysis may also confront the "denominator
problem," i.e., whether the reduction deprives the user of all economically
beneficial use of a portion of the right or just diminishes the value of the right
as a whole."' Where the water right is attendant to land ownership, as with
riparian rights, should a court evaluate the takings claim with respect to only
the water right, or should the water and land assets be evaluated together as a
whole?
These questions remain largely unresolved. Takings liability in the water
management context typically arises where the government is acting in a proprietary manner, either physically taking water for its own use or reallocating it
to other proprietary users.' Such circumstances are distinguishable from state
204. LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 3:92.
205. See Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and The Pubhc Trust Doctrine: Some
Realism About the Takings Issue, 27 ARIz. ST. LJ. 423, 429-30 (1995) (discussing the complexities of takings categorization in the water context).
206. Seeid. at 430-31; RegulatedRpatianismn, supra note 138, § 9.04(a).
207. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982); see also Grant, supranote 205, at 42931 .(discussing whether courts should evaluate takings claims in the water rights context as real
property, to which the Lucas test applies, or akin to personal property, to which it does not
apply).
208. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (setting forth an
ad hoc factual test that balances the economic impact of the regulatory restriction, the owner's
distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action).
209. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428; see also Grant, supra note 205, at 428-34.
210. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
211. See Grant, supra note 205, at 432-33. The Lucas court reasoned that the answer to the
"denominator problem" "may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped
by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the takings
claimant alleges a diminutiod in (or elimination of) value." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
212. See, e.g., McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 644-46 (Ohio 2005) (allowing
a takings case to proceed against a city where the city's groundwater production allegedly interfered and diminished plaintiff landowner's ability to produce groundwater). Three older Supreme Court cases similarly found the federal government liable for takings where the govern-
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regulations that effectively arbitrate between competing public and private interests in water."'
Federal courts have decided a few cases regarding takings claims in response to federal actions providing instream flows for endangered species,
which reduced water supply for consumptive use."' Three of these cases held
that the federal actions, which reduced the claimants' water supply, should be
evaluated as physical takings.' However, because these cases concern federally-imposed restrictions, questions remain concerning takings law as applied to
the state management of water allocations among competing water uses."
ment expropriated water from a private user for its own use or for a third party's proprietary
use. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (holding that a physical taking occurred where the
federal government expropriated a downstream riparian landowner's water rights by damming a
river upstream, storing the water and diverting it for irrigation and utility projects); United States
v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 752-53 (1950) (holding that a physical taking occurred
where the federal government expropriated downstream riparian land owners' water rights by
capturing, storing and diverting water from two California rivers for sale to private energy and
irrigation interests); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 408 (1931) (holding that a
physical taking occurred where the federal government took a paper company's water rights and
conferred them to a power company to use for wartime production of electrical power).
213. See, e.g., Crookston Cattle Co. v. Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., 300 N.W.2d 769, 774
(Minn. 1980). In Crookston, the court explained that "[1]ike zoning legislation, legislation which
limits or regulates the right to use underlying water is permissible." Id. The court distinguished
between regulation that operates for the sole benefit of a governmental enterprise and disproportionately burdens a few landowners for which compensation is due and regulation that arbitrates between competing public and private interests in water for which no compensation is
due. Id.
214. Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (allowing a
takings claim to proceed against federal restrictions reducing federal contract water deliveries);
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that federal
requirement upon a California water district to release water to which it was entitled from its
diversion works for a fish ladder for endangered fish should be analyzed as a physical taking);
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001) (holding
that reductions in water deliveries pursuant to federal irrigation contracts to coinply with instream flow requirements necessitated by the Endangered Species Act rendered plaintiffs' usufructuary right to that water valueless, and thus effected a physical taking); but see Klamath
Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 538 (2005) (criticizing the reasoning in Tulare
Lake and denying a takings claim where the federal government halted irrigation deliveries to
contracting farmers for a year because low water levels threatened endangered fish species).
215. Stockton, 583 F.3d at 1369; Casitas,543 F.3d at 1296; Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319 (reasoning that "luinlike other species of property where use restrictions may limit some, but not all
of the incidents of ownership, the denial of a right to the use of water accomplishes a complete
extinction of all value."). Contra Klamath., 67 Fed. Cl. at 538 (criticizing the reasoning in Tulare
lake).
216. As a general matter, the federal government may not take water without regard for state
water rights, but rather must perfect water rights for federal activities in the same manner as any
other proprietary user. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674-75 (1978) (holding that
federal government must comply with state laws regarding control, appropriation, and use of
water). Moreover, it is unclear whether a physical taking can occur in cases involving irrigation
contracts where the irrigator does not possess the water right, but only possesses a contractual
right to receive water obtained from the irrigation project. Compare Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319
(holding that reductions necessitated by the Endangered Species Act impaired water deliveries
pursuant to irrigation contracts and effected a physical taking of plaintiffs usufructuary right to
that water), with Knamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 540 (denying a takings claim where the federal government halted irrigation deliveries pursuant to an irrigation contract to protect endangered fish
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In the state context, takings analysis should focus on reasonable public and
private expectations and the distribution of regulatory burdens among competing water users."' Water rights, like all property, are inherently subject to reasonable regulatory constraints to avoid injury to other water rights holders and
the broader public."' Accordingly, water rights holders must tailor their expectations pertaining to water rights to accommodate the inherent nature of water
as a shared and variable resource."' Expectations must incorporate uncertainties arising from natural fluctuations in supply, the actions of other water users,
and reasonably tailored state regulations to protect public interests.' A water
rights priority, thus, does not guarantee an absolute quantity of water but rather
constitutes a risk allocation priority among competing beneficial users of water." A water right holder may reasonably expect legal protection of the priority his right affords. However, he should not expect that it will yield a perpetual,
definite, and specific quantity of water."
The relevance of reasonable expectations within takings jurisprudence
correlates with the premise that takings liability does not arise unless the government action exceeds the relevant background principles of state law.' For
example, regulations adopted to abate a public nuisance will not incur takings
liability because property law does not protect activities that result in a public
nuisance." Likewise, Supreme Court precedent suggests that "'reasonable

species), and Anderson, supra note 123, at 468-70, 489-90, 506 (arguing that the Tulare court
erred in equating the beneficial use of water by federal contractors with usufructuary water rights
and asserting that the right to make beneficial use of water in one's possession (e.g., as a result of
water supply contract) is separate and distinct from a water right, which affords a nonpossessory
right to withdraw water from a watercourse), andJohn Leshy, supra note 133 at 1985 n.2.
217. The United States Supreme Court's takings opinions have emphasized that a principal
purpose of the takings doctrine is to compensate for the destruction of investment-backed expectations. See, e.g., Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Penn Central,
438 U.S. 104, 124; see also A Dozen Propositions,supra note 14, at 267, 285-86 ("ITihe essence of traditional takings law is an effort to balance private rights and public rights as they coevolve over time."); Grant, supra note 205, at 437-42; TARLOCK, supranote 22, S 3:92.
218.
See supra Part IV.C and cases cited rnfra note 222; see also The Pubhc Trust Doctrine
andPrivate Property,supra note 85, at 653.
See discussion supra Part III.A, IV.A, IV.F.
219.
220. This point is not intended to suggest that all state actions directed at protection of a
public interest in the water source are necessarily consistent with reasonable expectations and
immune from takings liability. State actions that deviate from applicable state water management
laws arguably exceed the scope of reasonable expectations and may be subject to takings liability. See infra Part IV.G.

221.

See A. Dan Tarlock, PriorAppropriation:Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L.

REv. 881, 886-87 (2000). We note that water rights within water systems that are comprehensively managed to balance water supplies and system-wide demands (e.g., adjudicated water
supplies) typically afford greater legal certainty for water rights holders, with a greater likelihood
of rendering a reliable quantity of supply.

222.

See Leshy, supra note 133, at 1986-87, 1991.

223. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (citing Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Conrnents on the Ethical Foundations of lust
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1239-41 (1967)); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001); A Dozen Propositions,supranote 14, at 276-77.
224.
Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 113 (1999), aFd,247 F.3d 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2001). The nuisance exception accommodates the same principle articulated by the
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investment-backed expectations' cannot exist in activities that the government
may declare contrary to environmental protection and resource conservation
goals."' Applied to the water management context, one may view reasonable
state regulations adopted to protect the public's interest in water resources
(e.g., adjusting baseline flows for environmental and other instream purposes)
as a legitimate exercise of the state's police power consistent with the state's
background property laws concerning water use.' Takings liability, therefore,
should not arise even if existing water rights are retroactively impaired as a
result of reasonable regulations, provided that prior and paramount rights are
given due regard in the allocation of supplies available for consumptive use.'
A number of cases have applied such reasoning to uphold water permitting or
other water management laws that restrict the use of water rights against takings
challenges.'
G. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE WILL NOT SHIELD THE STATE FROM
TAKINGS LIABILITY WHERE LIABILITY SHOULD OTHERWISE ARISE

Although reasonable water use regulations are likely to withstand takings
challenges for the reasons discussed above, the government may incur takings
liability where restrictions on water rights violate reasonable private expectaSupreme Court in Lucas that the government is not liable for regulation to abate a nuisance or
nuisance-like activity because such "uses" of property do not inhere in a property owner's title.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30; see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("[Alll
property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not
be injurious to the community."); A Dozen Propositions,supranote 14, at 275-76.

225. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 673 (citing and discussing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1008-09 (1984)).
226. The Hawaii Supreme Court adopted this logic, citing the Lucas takings exception for
pre-existing regulatory limitations on title. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,
490 (Haw. 2000). The court upheld the denial of an application for a groundwater withdrawal
permit on the grounds that the withdrawal was inconsistent with a comprehensive regulatory
system governing withdrawals in designated groundwater management areas. See id. at 490-91.
The court reasoned that "the reserved sovereign prerogatives over the waters of the state precludes the assertion of vested rights contrary to public trust purposes," and is therefore a preexisting limitation on title under Lucas. Id. at 494. However, for the reasons discussed, there is
no need to rely on the public trust doctrine to conclude that water rights are subject to a preexisting limitation on title - i.e., potential state modification to protect public interests. See discussion supra Part IV.F.
227. This is certainly true where the water withdrawal permit expressly conditions the right
on the prospect of future state modification. Arguably, the same result arises even without express permit language where the action is supported by background water management principles. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 ("It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects
the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted
by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers ... .") (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
228. See, e.g., Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1328-29 (Ariz.
1981); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 492-95; F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1172-74 (Kan. 1981); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 595-96
(Kan. 1962); Crookston Cattle v. Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., 300 N.W.2d 769, 774 (Minn.
1980); McDonald v. State, 722 P.2d 598 (Mont. 1986); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728,
733 (N.D. 1968); Kline v. State ex rel. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 759 P.2d 210, 212-13 (Okla.
1988).
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tions. The takings analysis, therefore, will often properly turn not on whether
the state may reallocate water for protection of public values, but on how the
state distributes the burdens of reallocation among public and private interests.'" As discussed above, it is not reasonable for a water right holder to expect that a water right will be immune from state regulations that seek to protect legitimate public interests.' On the other hand, a water right holder can
reasonably expect that the state will adhere to applicable water rights principles
when regulating water uses. A water right holder may also reasonably expect
that the state will apply water regulations without arbitrary discrimination and
consistent with due process and other constitutional limitations.
Where the burdens of water regulations are not fairly distributed consistent with applicable state water rights principles, a court may find the government liable for a takings claim, notwithstanding a defense based in the public trust." For example, a takings claim may succeed in a prior appropriation
state if the state were to limit water available to a senior water right holder for
instream flow purposes but not demand the same of junior water rights holders."' Consistent with this reasoning, a California -appellate court ruled that the
state water board could not condition the transfer and assignment of a senior
priority appropriation permit by requiring the recipient water district to curtail
its withdrawals to facilitate the attainment of downstream water quality standards when the water board did not impose similar conditions on junior water
rights holders."' Although the court recognized the state's authority to impose
appropriate conditions on state water rights to achieve water quality standards,
it refused to condone the disparate treatment that burdened only the senior
water right holder and not the junior priority rights holders.' To so allow, the
court explained, would eliminate the entire advantage of possessing a senior
right, effectively defeating the reasonable expectations of the water district receiving the senior priority right.' Although the district brought this case as an
administrative mandamus action, the same reasoning could support an inverse
condemnation claim where the state applies state regulations in an arbitrary
and disparate manner, inconsistent with state water management principles.
Takings liability might also arise if the state were to expropriate water from
a senior water right holder for consumptive use by the state or to make additional water available for another user."' Such expropriation by the state would
229. See Lngle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980), abrogatedon othergrounds by LI gle, 544 U.S. at 542.
230. See discussion supraPart III.C; supra text accompanying notes 218-22.
231. See notes 228-231 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., id. at 494-96.
233. Id. The California Supreme Court has also reaffirmed the importance of adherence to
the state's priority principles in the context of an adjudication of groundwater rights, rejecting the
view that the state should allocate groundwater pursuant to a principle of equitable apportionment that ignored legal priority, even in an overappropriated groundwater basin. City of Barstow
v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 858 (Cal. 2000).
234. ElDoradoIrationDist., 48 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
235. Id. at 494-95.
236. See, e.g., McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 646 (Ohio 2005) (holding that
landowners have a property interest in the groundwater underlying their land, and governmental
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be effectively equivalent to federal expropriations historically held to be a
physical taking, unless it were undertaken pursuant to some preexisting state
water management principle."
In riparian states, a state's general adherence to reasonable and evenhanded standards when distributing the burden of water use regulations among
affected water users will likely immunize the state from takings liability.. On
the other hand, a state-imposed reduction or modification to a riparian water
right that starkly deviates from expectations of fair treatment may incur takings
liability. Examples might include disparate treatment of individual water users
without a rational basis or state expropriation of water for proprietary purposes."
Where water regulations materially compromise a water right holder's reasonable expectations for fair treatment, the public trust doctrine is unlikely to
provide a defense against a takings claim. Modem opinions of the Supreme
Court have made clear that "claims of sovereign ownership are but legal fictions that offer no special immunity to challenges of transgressing constitutional limits."" In consistent fashion, the Federal Court of Claims explained that it
interference with that right by virtue of drilling nearby wells that impede the groundwater supply
to landowner's wells can constitute an unconstitutional taking); State Hwy. Comm. v. Ponten,
463 P.2d 150, 155 (Wash. 1969) (holding that "there is a property right (correlative though it
may be) in percolating waters," and the state was liable for its taking of landowners' groundwater
through interference with groundwater supply caused by highway construction); see also Schick
v. Fla. Dep't of Agric., 504 So. 2d 1318, 1320-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Dermody v. City of
Reno, 931 P.2d 1354 (Nev. 1997); Volknann v. City of Crosby, 120 N.W.2d 18, 23-24 (N.D.
1963).
237. As noted above, when the state or any of its subdivisions desires to obtain water for
proprietary purposes (as opposed to state regulation for the common public benefit), the state
must adhere to state water management laws in the same manner as other proprietary water
users. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18. Thus, if instead of conforming to the state
water management regime, the state sought to expropriate water for proprietary purposes, the
state would likely be found liable for a physical taking. See McNmara, 838 N.E.2d at 644-46.
238. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979).
239. See, e.g., Schick, 504 So. 2d at 1320-21; Volknann, 120 N.W.2d at 23-24; McjVanara, 838 N.E.2d at 646; State Hwy. Comm. v. Ponten, 463 P.2d 150, 155-56 (Wash. 1969).
240. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 675.
241. See id. at 713. Lazarus cites to several Supreme Court opinions in the context of
dormant commerce, supremacy, and takings clause challenges, including Sporhase v. Neb. ex
rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982) (holding that sovereign ownership of water does not
excuse disparate treatment of out-of-state water users from the negative implications of the
commerce clause), Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334-35 (1979) (holding similarly in
relation to claims of sovereign ownership of fish by the state), and Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979) (rejecting the govemment's takings defense based in the federal navigable servitude - a historical companion of the public trust doctrine - explaining that the doctrine simply expresses the government's important public interest in the flow of navigable interstate waters). Lazarus also notes a characterization of the Iinois Central decision by Justice
Brennan as standing merely for the basic proposition that "all private rights of property, even if
acquired through contract with the State, are subordinated to reasonable exercises of the States'
lawmaking powers in the areas of... environmental protection." Lazarus, supra note 12, at 713
(citing U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 50 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Certain
courts have invoked the public trust doctrine to justify decisions denying takings claims in relation to state prohibitions of private activities in navigable waters (e.g., filling. dredging, or development), explaining that under the Lucas takings exceptions for state actions consistent with
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does "not read National Audubon as standing for the proposition that water
rights in California are beyond the protection of the Fifth Amendment.
In summary, takings analysis in the water context should reflect a common
sense approach. The state needs adequate flexibility to modify water allocations over time as necessary to promote the public welfare without risk of takings liability. However, the state must respect applicable water management
laws and water rights priorities. The public trust doctrine does not change the
necessary analysis of the relative regulatory burdens of a particular water management action, nor provide guidance on how to prudently balance public and
private interests within the state's water management regime.' Instead, the
state must address these difficult legal issues directly and transparently without
the cloud of an antiquated legal fiction.'
V. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE THREATENS TO IMPEDE
BALANCED WATER MANAGEMENT
Not only is the public trust doctrine not needed for the state to effectively
manage water resources, reliance upon the doctrine-particularly legislative
efforts to declare state water resources subject to the public trust-is ill-advised.
This is so for at least four reasons discussed below.
A. USE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE FOR WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT WOULD BE A SUPERFICIAL "SOLUTION"

Public welfare suffers if policymakers embrace the public trust doctrine in
lieu of developing detailed standards and procedures that acknowledge competing policy goals. Balanced water management follows from a mature dialogue about the reasonableness of public and private expectations and the
proper role of government, markets, and other institutional forums. Reliance
on the public trust doctrine would stifle this necessary dialogue. In lieu of canrelevant background principles of state law, such private actions were inconsistent with the public trust doctrine and thus state law. See Thompson, supra note 85, at 54 (discussing cases reaching such holdings). A relevant inquiry, though beyond the scope of this article, would be the
nature of comparative public and private expectations regarding the private activity prohibited in
these cases. For our purposes, state actions that deviate from applicable water right principles,
and thus compromise reasonable private expectations, are likely to lead to takings liability consistent with the Supreme Cofirt precedent discussed above.
242. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 457 (2011), afd,708 F.3d
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
243. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 674-679, 702-10; Govermnent Ownership, supra note
18, at 654.
244. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 674-79, 702-710; Government Ownership, supra note
18, at 654. For a candid acknowledgement of the limitations of state constitutional provisions
declaring public ownership of natural resources, see Klass, supra note 12, at 719 (explaining that
such state constitutional provisions "by necessity contain broad, aspirational language usually
devoid of the specific standards necessary to implement concrete measures to protect the environment in a complex world," and acknowledging that "the critics are correct that the type of
clarity and detail needed to implement environmental policy is better suited to legislative and
administrative pronouncements (or even common law) and is not at home in constitutional
documents.").
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did analysis, the doctrine presents ambiguous standards emanating from antiquated notions of public ownership of water resources. The doctrine provides
no specific procedural or substantive standards to guide decision-makers and
lacks transparency as a basis for decision-making. Simply put, it cannot provide a policy "shortcut" to the sophisticated and detailed analysis that is necessary to foster balanced water management
Although substantive law is fully able to protect public interests with respect to water management, some may nonetheless continue to promote the
public trust doctrine for its aspirational or visionary connotation." This premise should be abandoned. The law should instead embrace balanced water
management for the sake of increased public welfare; not because of an obsolete characterization of water as "public property."
B. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE WATER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT WOULD BE AMBIGUOUS

The public trust doctrine is further problematic because the ambiguous
scope of its application would create uncertainty and conflict. The proposed
Michigan legislation cited at the beginning of this article is a good example. If
the Michigan legislature enacted the legislation, the law would have declared
that the waters of Michigan are to be "held in trust."' Such bare embrace of
the public trust doctrine as a basis for water management would not inform
how or under what conditions the state should apportion available water, nor
how the state should distribute regulatory burdens among competing water
users. Those left to interpret the statute would have to determine which public
interests are covered by the trust, and whether the legislature intended a procedural review of the "feasibility" of protecting those interests, or instead intended specific substantive results for future water management decisions."'
As another example, Vermont has adopted a statute that declares groundwater subject to the public trust, but also declares that various consumptive
uses of groundwater are deemed to comply with the public trust requirements." These uses include: withdrawals for which the state has issued a permit, domestic and residential uses, withdrawals for public water systems, withdrawals for permitted potable water supplies, farming conducted consistent
with statutory terms, and licensed dairy processors or milk handlers.' Like245. Jack Tuholske, Trusting the Pubbc Trust Apphcation of the Pubc Trust Doctrne to
Groundwater Resources, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 236 (2008) (arguing that application of the
public trust doctrine to the protection of water resources "provides an important statement that
can shift public views in favor of protecting public resources. The public trust 'crosses over from
the law to a pure statement of social vision.'") (citations omitted); A Comparative Guide to the
Western States'Public Trust Doctrine,supra note 35, at 83 ("IT]he legal recognition of a 'public trust' provides both a rhetorically resonant articulation of the larger public interests in intact
and functional ecosystems and a means of imposing broad duties on governments to act for the
long-term preservation of ecosystems and other environmental values . .
246. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
247. See discussion supraPart II.D.
248. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1390 (2008); § 1418(b) (2010).
249. Id S 1418(b).
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wise, legislation proposed in Hawaii (but not adopted) would have designated
certain agricultural uses as a public trust value.' The intent of such declarations is unclear. Is the intent to designate certain uses, such as domestic and
agricultural uses, as more deserving of water than other uses?" If the legislature can assign the public trust crown to certain consumptive uses deemed
worthy of that prestige, is there any rational limit to such coronation? Could a
state, for instance, designate water used for production of semiconductors-a
high water-demand industry-a public trust value to reflect its importance to
high wage employment and tax revenue?
These examples highlight the significant confusion that can stem from
statutory adoption of the public trust doctrine. Such ambiguity invites unnecessary conflict because solutions and consensus are more likely to emerge where
stakeholders can readily ascertain the likely implications of a defined management structure rather than circumstances in which fear of uncertainties
thwarts compromise." Such potential confusion and resulting conflict is unnecessary in light of the ample alternatives to protect the public interest in water management discussed above. "
C. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE WATER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT WOULD FOSTER EXTREMISM

Another risk the public trust doctrine presents in the water management
context is the potential misuse of the doctrine in support of extreme positions
that are incongruous with overall social welfare. Some argue that the public
trust doctrine mandates protection of trust values over other interests (e.g.,
consumptive use withdrawals), or even flatly prohibits particular uses of water,
presumptively even if the broader public welfare suffers as a result.' Those
250. The legislation proposed designating public trust purposes to include "resource protection, domestic uses, upholding the exercise of native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights,
and the conservation and protection of agricultural activity on lands identified and designated as
important agricultural lands. . . ."S.B. 1296, 25th Leg. 1st Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009). We note that
the Hawaii Supreme Court has explained that a Hawaiian statute that articulates a policy preference to preserve water supplies for, among other purposes, municipal uses, public recreation,
public water supply, agriculture, and navigation "generally mirrors the public trust principles." In
re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 457-58 (Haw. 2000) (citing HAw. REV. STAT. §
174C-2 (1999)).
251. State legislatures can, and often do, articulate preference among water uses, but these
pronouncements are specifically articulated as the will of the public's representatives. See, e.g.,
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-157(B) (1994); CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 1943); IowA
CODE §§ 455B.266(2)(a)-(i) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 5-502(d) (West 2010); MINN
STAT. §§ 103G.261(a)(1)-(6) (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE §61-04-06.1 (West 1977); VA. CODE
ANN. S 62.1-2421 (West 1989).

252. See Creation ofNew Risk Sharng Water Enddement Regimes, supra note 101, at 68688 (describing the Truckee-Carson Settlement as a basin-wide settlement in which compromise
was fostered by an understanding of, and commitment to, an equitable and transparent physical
solution).
253.

See discussion supraParts IV.A-F.

254. See e.g., James M. Olson, Navigating the Great Lakes Compact: Water, Pubic Trust,
and InternationalTrade Agreements, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1103, 1130-32 (2006) (arguing
that the public trust doctrine prohibits the alienation or transfer of water for private commercial
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espousing this view essentially seek to replicate the strict substantive restrictions traditional public trust cases employ to limit the state's discretion to
manage water.' Dissatisfied with prior political, administrative, and judicial
results, some promote the public trust doctrine as a means to vindicate their
insular views.' For example, one author urges reliance on the public trust doctrine to effectively overturn the Michigan Court of Appeal's adoption of a
"reasonable use balancing test"" because such a test could allow private water
users to take and use water off-parcel.' These advocates seek to remove the
discretion of administrative and judicial decisionmakers and instead prohibit
certain uses made by private enterprise." Such a view is antithetical to balanced water management. If the public. trust doctrine is applied to favor public
trust values-however they may be defined"-over other public interests, the
purposes unless there is explicit legislative authority and the purpose is primarily a public one,
and that regardless of the purpose, the use, transfer, or withdrawal of water cannot significantly
impair the public trust); Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, Protecting the Pubhlic Trust and Human
Rights in the Great Lakes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1333, 1343-45 (2006) (arguing that
"Ipirivatization, whether it is by taking over municipal services or by selling water in bottles, can
be at odds with protecting the public trust in water."); Koehler, supra note 88, at 543 (arguing
that "the doctrine places a substantive burden on the state to protect trust resources affected by
water rights and to allow harm to these assets only when it is infeasible to do otherwise."); see
also State Water Resources Control Board Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (2006) (explaining
and dismissing argument by plaintiffs that in resolving conflicts between public trust values and
competing water uses, the state must favor public trust protection whenever possible); Noah D.
Hall, Protectng FreshwaterResources in the Era of Global Water Markets: Lessons Learned
From Bottled Water, 13 U. DENv. WATER L. REV. 1, 46-51 (2009) (discussing arguments and
efforts by opponents of bottled water to use the public trust doctrine to support their claim that
water cannot be sold for profit, but dismissing such theories as likely untenable and noting that
no court has ever applied the doctrine to bar the sale of water for profit). Advocates for an application of the public trust doctrine that would effectively prohibit private uses of water often
correlate with interest groups that denounce "commodification" or "privatization" of water. For
an assessment of the arguments for and against private rights, private enterprise, and market
forces respecting the acquisition and distribution of water, and an overview of the attendant
global controversy, see Montgomery F. Simus & James G. Workman, The Water Ethic: The
Inexorable Bith ofa CertainAlenable Right 23 TUL. ENVTL. 14. 439, 441-42 (2010).
255. See Olson, supra note 254, at 1130-31; see also discussion supra Part II.B (discussing
the traditional public trust doctrine).
256. See Olson, supranote 254, at 1118-19; see also Hall, supra note 254, at 46-51 (discussing the embrace of the public trust doctrine by bottled water opponents to seek substantive
restrictions on water bottling not otherwise available from existing regulatory and judicial venues); Democracy, Distrust,and the Publc Trus4 supra note 35, at 407-33 (evaluating and ultimately dismissing comparisons and analogies between the public trust doctrine and the processbased doctrine of equal protection that demands enhanced judicial scrutiny of political decisions
concerning discrete and insular minorities or suspect classis).
257. Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am. Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174,
194 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
258. See Olson, supra note 254, at 1118-19.
259. It appears that some modern advocates believe that the public trust doctrine inherently
prohibits or disfavors uses of water for private business ventures. See discussion supranote 254.
Such positions are counter to the central goal of water management to maximize public welfare,
which requires that water management laws facilitate inclusion of all public interests. See discussion, supra Parts III, IV.A.
260. Presumably, public trust values in the water management context would be limited to
instrean interests. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal.
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doctrine simply becomes a tool to benefit special interests to the detriment of
the broader public welfare, despite the societal consequences." Most legal
authority has rejected claims that the doctrine removes management discretion
or compels substantive (as opposed to procedural) results."' Still, the potential
for misuse of the doctrine is another reason to favor specific water management laws over the public trust doctrine and its inherent ambiguities.
D. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE WOULD BE AN INADEQUATE BASIS TO
MANAGE MODERN WATER PROBLEMS

Application of the public trust doctrine in the water management context
not only lacks clarity but its historic, geographic, and substantive limitations
would also restrain its effectiveness, albeit appropriately.' Although the doctrine's reach has expanded in some instances, courts will likely be reluctant to
expand the doctrine beyond its traditional moorings of navigable waters and
historically protected interests out of respect for judicial precedent, separation
of powers, and constitutional limitations.' Direct water management laws, by
1983) (dismissing an assertion by the California Attorney General that "trust uses" encompass
all public uses, so that in practical effect the doctrine would impose no restrictions on the state's
ability to allocate trust property, and noting that "Imlost decisions and commentators assume
that 'trust uses' relate to uses and activities in the vicinity of the lake, stream, or tidal reach at
issue."). However, the definition of public trust values is not entirely settled. See Lazarus, supra
note 12, at 649-52 (discussing an expansive array of applications of the public trust doctrine to
resources other than navigable water).
261. In this respect, we should be mindful of the vast context in which water supports social
welfare. Consumptive uses of water, typically by private interests, support critical elements of
social welfare, including food, shelter, energy, products, and jobs. Likewise, environmental and
other instream water uses have definite value despite certain difficulties in calculating that value.
See GIBBONS, supra note 23, at 65-71 (1986). Whether any particular use advances or impairs
the public interest is case-specific, and often subject to dispute. Thus, the scope of affected
public interest in relation to the allocation of water should be broadly perceived, and narrow
characterizations .of the public interest that ignore, or arbitrarily discount, the vast scope of applicable costs and benefits should be resisted.
262. See, e.g., State Water Resources Control Board.Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2006) ("[lin determining whether it is 'feasible' to protect public trust values like fish
and wildlife in a particular instance, the Board must determine whether protection of those
values, or what level of protection, is 'consistent with the public interest."'); Parks v. Cooper, 676
N.W.2d 823, 838 (S.D. 2004) (explaining that South Dakota's Water Resources Act evinces a
legislative intent both to allocate and regulate water resources that, in effect, codifies public trust
principles); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comrnm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 461, 463 (N.D. 1976) (holding that the public trust doctrine requires the state engineer to
undertake water planning to determine the effect of a proposed allocation on the present water
supply and future needs of the state); see also Thompson, supra note 85, at 65 (explaining that
no public trust case has ever directly overturned a legislative decision and that most have either
upheld legislative or executive actions or preserved opportunities for the democratic branches of
government to exercise authority over trust resources); Hall, supra note 254, at 5 (noting that no
court has ever applied the public trust doctrine to bar the sale of water for profit or to prohibit
commercial bottled water operations); Pubhlic Property and the Democratization of Western
Water Law, supra note 1, at 590 ("The result lof recent ecological public trust cases] has been a
judicial emphasis on process fairness and 'reasoned decision-making' from administrators,
rather than particular substantive results.").
263. See Lazarus, supa note 12, at 710-15.
264. See id.

94

WA TER IA WREVIEW

Volume 17

contrast, are not so constrained, and instead will stand or fail, as they should,
on a candid comparison of reasonable public and private expectations and the
constitutional propriety of the government's allocation of water among competing interests.' If, on the other hand, "rogue" judges were to rely on the
public trust doctrine as a basis to exceed the limits of existing laws and constitutional norms, the result would be contrary to the rule of law, democratic
government, and the traditional interpretive role of the judiciary.'

VI. FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR BALANCED WATER
MANAGEMENT
In this final section, we briefly review how specific water management laws
may be tailored to address modern water supply issues without reliance on the
public trust doctrine's shortcomings. In contemplating how states may improve
their water management laws, we should observe that problems concerning the
allocation of water generally arise either from overuse that threatens the sustainability of the resource or from ineficient use; meaning, either excessive use
in relation to a specific demand or inefficient allocation in relation to other
competing uses for the water (i.e., the "opportunity cost").' In general terms,
states may address such problems through the following seven management
strategies:
1. Effective water management requires accurate technical understanding. Thus,
the collection of data and the development of state, regional, and local water
management plans are often appropriate initial efforts.
2. Grounded in sound science and technical data, states should establish maximum system yields. States should also monitor total (combined) water use
and restrict the system-wide use as is necessary to ensure long-term sustaina265. See discussionsupra Parts IV.E-G.
266. See Speakug ofInconvenient Truths, supra note 1, at 98-101, 103 (arguing that if the
jus publicum-i.e., the public right that traditionally affords public access to navigable water and
related submerged lands-is conflated with the much broader public interest, "a special interest
can be converted to a public right by the stroke of a sympathetic judge's pen" to the jeopardy of
the rule of law and the democratic process).
267. Economic theory describes these problems as results of the tragedy of the commons
and the tragedy of the anticommons. The commonly referenced tragedy of the commons results
in the overuse of the resource where multiple users possess open access to use the resource
without a cost-effective means to monitor and constrain each other's use. See Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-45, 1248 (1968); see also Special Challenges, supra note 173, at 311-13 (discussing the tragedy of the commons in relation to the use
of water). In other words, where water belongs to everyone, it is in no one's particular interest to
preserve it. The less frequently discussed tragedy of the anticommons results in an underutilization of a resource where multiple parties hold rights to exclude use by others. The tragedy of the
anticommons may explain underutilization of voluntary market transactions to efficiently reallocate water from lower to higher-valued uses. Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, WaterMarkets
as a Tragedy of the Anticommons, 33 WM. & MARY ENvrL. L. & POLY REv. 723, 725-27
(2009). One may view both problems in the context of the Coase Theorem, whereby otherwise
efficient voluntary transactions do not occur where transaction costs exceed the gains of trade.
R. H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cos43J.L & EcON. 1, 5-6,15-16,40,43 (1960).
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bility of the resource and appropriate protection of environmental and other
public interests.
3.

States should apportion system-wide yields into well-defined individual water
rights that quantify and limit the amount that can be withdrawn, particularly
with respect to significant users that are likely to impose a material impact on
the water supply source.'

4.

To avoid unnecessary conflict and constitutional infirmities, states must afford all relevant interests, including environmental and other diffuse public
interests, due process when establishing system-wide yields and individual water withdrawal allotments.

5.

States should base restrictions on withdrawals on technical findings and apply
water use limitations consistent with the state's water rights laws. Likewise,
states should avoid arbitrary discrimination against particular water users
based on the location or purpose of use without regard to resource impacts.
Such restrictions may result in inefficient allocations and may also transgress
constitutional norms such as due process, takings, and dormant commerce
clause limitations.

6.

States should establish oversight institutions, if not already in effect, to monitor and manage the water system, modify the management system when appropriate, and resolve any conflicts that may arise among stakeholders. State
or local agencies, the courts, and various hybrid strategies may be viable so
long as the oversight is responsive to future management needs and the state
affords due process to affected interests.

7.

States should establish well-defined rules and procedures to facilitate voluntary transfers of water rights, which stimulate conservation and efficient reallocations.' States must regulate transfers to afford appropriate protection of

268. Efforts to provide greater definition and legal certainty for water rights often correlate
with scarcity. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983) ("The doctrine of prior appropriation, the prevailing law in the Western States, is itself largely a product of the compelling
need for certainty in the holding and use of water rights."); A Dozen Propositions, supra note
14, at 269, 273 (discussing the common correlation between the evolution of property rights and
scarcity). This correlation is revealed by the difference between the historically loosely-defined
riparian rights in the water-endowed eastern states and the better-defined appropriative rights in
the water-scarce western states. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 45 (noting that property rights are
correlated with scarcity, and comparing riparian and prior appropriation states as an example).
The legal elements of riparianism and prior appropriation are discussed supra at Part IV.B. As
water supplies become more scarce in relation to demand, law and policy typically respond by
better defining the entitlements and limitations that embody a water right. This shift is evident in
the transition in eastern states from common law riparianism to regulated riparianism that imposes permitting regimes with quantified withdrawal allowances. See Special Challenges, supra
note 173, at 315, 317, 327-29. In addition to permitting requirements, eastern states have also
begun to develop comprehensive planning initiatives to manage their water resources in the face
of emerging scarcity conditions. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-520 to -525 (2013);FLA.
STAT. §§ 373.012-.200 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. S 62.1-44.38:1 (2013).
269. Voluntary transfers among users also affords the potential to: (1) incentivize conservation by those that may achieve gains by transferring saved water, (2) reallocate water allocations
to higher-valued uses, and (3) foster accurate water pricing, which thereby correlates water use to
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affected third-party water rights holders, the environment, and other public
interests. However, excessive regulatory burdens, or opportunities for thirdparty impediments, may raise the transaction costs of consummating transfers
and thereby preclude efficient reallocations when the transaction costs exceed
the gains of trade." States should scrutinize and tailor transfer rules to balance protections for other water users and instream interests with the social
benefits realized by voluntary exchanges.
Even-handed water management strategies, such as those outlined above,
may accommodate competing public and private interests and balance countervailing policy goals. For example, the system can promote legal certainty
while facilitating flexible and adaptive management."' Although the state may
adjust consumptive uses from the common source as necessary, users can
employ voluntary exchanges to hedge against the uncertainty that results from
the prospect of system-wide adjustments. Individual users that have a need of
higher degrees of certainty (e.g., municipal and industrial users) may acquire
higher priority rights while those who are willing to bear the risk of shortage
may rely on lower priority water rights."' Although there is no absolute certainty in relation to the collective quantity of available supply from any particular
source, the state can promote legal certainty by developing and adhering to
transparent allocation rules on which water users can plan, undertake voluntary transfers, and structure investments. In this respect, a well-defined water
rights system is essential to efficient water management."'

the marginal utility of the use. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Principlesfor Water, 15 TUL. ENVTL.
LJ. 335, 336, 354, 358 (2002); see also POSNER, supra note 23, at 41 (noting that "creation of
individual (as distinct from collective) ownership rights is a necessary, rather than sufficient,
condition for the efficient use of resources" because "[elfliciency requires a mechanism by
which the [property owner] can be induced to transfer the property to . . . someone else.").
Although voluntary transfers provide significant opportunities for improved efficiency in the use
of water, water markets are unique because of the shared and transient nature of the resource.
As a result, water markets often face significant challenges that can prevent eflicient transfers
from occurring. Bretsen & Hill, supra note 267, at 742, 782.
270. Bretsen & Hill, supra note 267, at 726, 728. But see Special Challenges, supra note 173,
at 310 (arguing that "[wlater is a commodity for which transaction costs are too high to allow
large-scale markets, and its importance to human life precludes denying access to those who
cannot pay for it").
271. Well-defined property rights that establish the opportunities and limitations inherent in
the right are essential to the effective management of the resource consistent with public and
private expectations relating to the resource, particularly as population and scarcity of the resource increase. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 43-45.
272. A variety of transfer arrangements may be appropriate, including absolute water right
sales, leases, dry-year fallowing options, and transfers based on groundwater substitution.
273. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 97 (noting that water right markets are often impeded by
difficulties in determining who owns which rights and in what scope or quantity, and further
stating that the institution of a title system for water rights analogous to the systems used to record land tide would promote efficiency of water markets).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Although the notion of a public trust in water resources has powerful rhetorical appeal as a "legal shorthand" to express public rights in a transient resource, the doctrine is insufficient and counterproductive to the development
of a mature water policy." It offers a legal "crutch" that avoids a direct dialogue about how the state should properly balance competing interests and,
consequently, fosters confusion regarding applicable legal standards. It may
also harm the public interest if special interests are successful in misusing the
doctrine to preclude balanced water management by casting an insular viewpoint as mandated by the public trust.' The law cannot turn on such talismanic charms. As Professor Frank Trelease observed several decades ago:
It must always be remembered that when we say "alakazam," or "state ownership," or the "state holds in trust," no genie out of a bottle brings us a beautiful maiden draped in pearls, and no magical solution is provided for difficult
problems of adjusting the relations of an individual to the state .. . in the
complex field of development of water resources.
The public trust doctrine simply does not offer an appropriate shortcut to
the development and application of specific water management standards and
procedures whereby complex and diverse public interests are candidly debated and evaluated on a case-specific basis. For this reason, policymakers should
resist calls to legislate or adopt the public trust doctrine as the basis for water
resource management, and instead apply their attention to developing a coherent and comprehensive body of detailed water management laws designed
to maximize public welfare.

274.
275.
276.

See discussion supra Part V.
See discussion supm Part V.C.
GoverrnentOwnership, supranote 18, at 654.

